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HOHFELD AND HEREFORDS: THE CONCEPT OF
PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF THE RANGE
JOHN S. HARBISON*
I should also [say] that the age of shepherds is that where government
first commences. Property makes it absolutely necessary. When once
it has been agreed that a cow or a sheep shall belong to a certain
person not only when actually in his possession but where ever it
may have strayed, it is absolutely necessary that the hand of government should be continually held up and the community assert their
power to preserve the property of the individualls.
Adam Smith**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article demonstrates the truth of the notion that a "man without
social relationships is a man without property."' Private property is a
set of relations comprised of the cross-cutting claims, privileges, duties
and no-claims that law confers and imposes on a group of persons with
reference to a tangible thing. 2 More precisely, it is a set of relations in
which "the so-called owner can exclude others from certain activities or
permit others to engage in those activities and in either case secure the
assistance of the law in carrying out his decision." 3 It is indispensable
to the concept of private property that law sanctions these relations.
"Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were
4
made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases."
This article illustrates the relational nature of property by examining
the statutes and cases that mediate the relationships of persons who enter
and make use of lands owned by the federal government and administered
by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). Federal grazing entitlements provide an especially good example of the relational nature of
rights because the weaker the rights, in terms of who can be excluded
from property, the more complex the relations. If there were a continuum

* Assistant Research Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. This project was
supported in part by the United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Library,
under Agreement No. 59-32U4-8-13 with the National Center for Agricultural Law, University of
Arkansas. I thank Jake Looney, Christopher Kelley, Richard Atkinson and Susan Pilcher for their
comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
** A. SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 208 (R. Meek, D. Raphael & P. Stein eds. 1978).
1. J. GOODY, DEATH, PROPERTY, AND THE ANCESTORS: A STUDY OF MORTUARY CUSTOMS OF
THE LODAGAA OF WEST AFRICA 287 (1962).
2. Cf. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELI L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) (a property right "is
a relation not between [its holder] and a thing, but between the [holder] and other individuals in
reference to things").
3. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. Rav. 357, 373 (1954).
4. J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (J.Dumont ed. 1864).
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of property rights with some that are absolute and universal at one end,
BLM grazing rights would be near the other. Of course, no right of
exclusion is absolute.' An absolute right is at best an unattainable ideal,
though not one to which all would aspire. Every individual's legal powers
must somehow accommodate the powers and immunities of others. Sorting
out these relations is what the law of property is all about. Courts and
legislatures do this by creating, limiting and occasionally eradicating
property rights.
The article is divided into five parts. Part II describes the grazing
permit and lease system established by the Taylor Grazing Act, 6 the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"), 7 and the regulations promulgated under these statutes.8 These laws create and limit
federal grazing rights. They establish requirements for obtaining grazing
permits and leases, provide for their modification while they are in effect,
and under certain conditions provide for their suspension or cancellation.
Part III clarifies some of the rights these laws confer on grazing
permittees and lessees by applying the juristic vocabulary of Wesley
Hohfeld. 9 According to Hohfeld, the totality of all property relations
can be specified with eight juristic terms: a group of entitlements (rights,
privileges, powers and immunities) and their correlatives (no-rights, duties,
disabilities and liabilities).' 0 These terms are correlatively related because
property is a relational concept. To say that Permittee White possesses
a grazing permit granting him a right of occupancy is meaningless except
in the context of his social relations. White's privilege to enter BLM
lands entails the absence of correlative claims in others to prevent his
entrance. His claim to exclude others entails their correlative duties not
to enter.
Parts IV and V, using the reported Taylor Grazing Act cases, focus
on the grazing permittee's right to exclude other livestock operators,
Indians asserting aboriginal title, and hardrock mineral prospectors. In
these Parts, we will see that the grazing permittee's rights of exclusion
are limited and complex. Privileges of entry and claims of exclusion may
refer to the same object from the different perspectives of two individuals.

5. Cf. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988) (noting the incomplete constitutionalization of the concepts
of exclusive possession, use and disposition).
6. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1988).
7. Id. §§ 1701-1782.
8. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4100.0-4170.2 (1990).
9. For Hohfeld's writings on this subject, see Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License
Cases, 27 YALE L.J. 66 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld III]; Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld I]; Hohfeld, Some
FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter
Hohfeld 11.
10. See Hohfeld I, supra note 9, at 36. It is immaterial whether Hohfeld's claim is right. The
utility of an analytical vocabulary resides not in its rightness but in its fitness. As Felix Cohen
says, "[a] definition of law is useful or useless. It is not true or false, any more than a New
Year's resolution or an insurance policy." Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv 809, 835-36 (1935).
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If Permittee White has a limited claim to exclude Grazier Black from
a BLM allotment, then Black has a limited privilege of entry. The exact
nature of White's grazing right vis-a-vis Black is defined by these limits.
However, White undoubtedly will have relationships with other people
defined by different sets of limits. Thus the complexity of property rights.
Hohfeldian claims, privileges, duties and no-claims are "the substance
of that insubstantial thing, the law."" Indeed, they are the basic currency
of most, if not all, legal rules. The salient feature of these concepts is
their correlative nature. One person's claim is another's duty. One person's
privilege is another's no-claim. The distinction between a claim and a
duty "is in the point of observation. If you look at the man whom the
court may smite, you see it as a duty. If you look at the man who may
call upon the court to smite the other, you see it as a right."' 2 It is in
this sense that property is relational. To say that Permittee White has
a property interest is to say that Grazier Black, or another known
individual, is affected in some way by this interest. The social meaning
of property is its only meaning.
Hohfeldian Themes
In his writings on rights, Hohfeld makes at least three key points.
The first, and perhaps most important, is that all rights are relational.
The second is that they are historically contingent.'" A third is that
abstract labels like license and easement do not convey the full meaning
of either social relations or legal rights. 14 These propositions are connected
as follows: a legal right has meaning only in the sense that it stands for
some specific claim or immunity held by one person with reference to
another. Claims and immunities are the property rights the government
will enforce at any given time." Because they are not derivable from a

A.

11. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BwsBLE BusH: ON OuR LAW A ND ITS STUDY 83 (1960) (emphasis in
original).
12. Id. at 85.
13. Cf. Fish, Force, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 883, 901-02 (1988) ("We remain embedded in
history even when we know that it is history we are embedded in, and while that knowledge may
be satisfying in relation to alternative stories about our convictions (for example that they correspond
or should correspond to the unchanging nature of things) in relation to the particular convictions
(including itself) by which we are not grasped and constituted, it is of no force whatsoever.").
14. See Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld,
1982 Wis. L. REv. 975, 992-93 (discussing the turn from conceptualism to nominalism, or from
deciding cases with reference to highly abstract a priori principles to seeing terms like license and
easement only as more or less convenient categories for organizing judicial decisions); Cohen, supra
note 10, at 838-39 ("[T]he meaning of a definition is found in its consequences .... The consequence
of defining law as a function of concrete judicial decisions is that we may proceed to define concepts
such as contract, property, title, corporate personality, right, and duty, similarly as functions of
concrete judicial decisions").
15. The rights that interest Hohfeld are those that are obtainable by invoking the coercive powers
of government. Cf. A. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PsucisvE MAN 28 (1954) ("A social norm is legal
if its neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of physical force
by an individual or group possessing the socially recognized privilege of so acting." (emphasis
omitted)); K. LLEwELLYN, supra note 11, at 84 ("A right is as big, precisely, as what the courts
will do."). In this, as in other ways, Hohfeld is a lineal ancestor of the Legal Realists. In fact,
Adamson Hoebel, coauthor of THn CHEYENNE WAY (1941) with Karl Llewellyn, uses Hohfeldian
analysis to explain the precontact property law of the Yurock Indians. Hoebel, FundamentalLegal
Concepts as Applied in the Study of Primitive Law, 51 YALE L.J. 951 (1942).
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priori abstractions, reductive categories like license and easement are at
best convenient pigeonholes where legal analysis begins rather than ends.
At worst, they are inconvenient.
The law of the range provides a particularly forceful means of demonstrating the continuing validity of these insights. First, the various
relationships between BLM permittees, lessees, agency officials, neigh-

boring ranchers, hunters, fishermen, backpackers, miners, sodbusters and
others are complex and multivariate. Second, the legal rights that inform
these relationships have evolved to meet changes in historical circumstances. And finally, grazing permits and leases are peculiar instruments.
Although they share features with a few of the traditional estates in
land, on the whole they are unique.
B.

The Federal Range and Rights to Its Use
Today, more than 19,000 ranchers hold grazing permits and leases

entitling them to pasture livestock on 158 million acres of federally
owned land under the jurisdiction of the BLM in sixteen Western
states.' 6 These permits and leases are issued under the Taylor Grazing
Act, legislation that closed the public domain in 1934. Prior to passage
of the Act, these lands were a commons open to unrestricted entry
by sheepherders, miners, cattlemen and any others confident they could

wring a living from arid country.' 7 In closing the public domain, the
Taylor Grazing Act put into place a policy of regulated and restricted
use.' 8
Permits to occupy federal grazing lands are granted under
section 3 of the Taylor Grazing Act.' 9 Leases are awarded under

16. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 26 (1990)
[hereinafter Ptrmuc LAND STATISTICS]. The states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming.
17. The public domain is made up of federally owned land that has not been reserved for some
special purpose such as a national park or national forest. Before the enactment of the Taylor
Grazing Act, the federal courts recognized an implied license to graze livestock on the public domain.
See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1889). See generally Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law
of Public Rangeland Management I: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
18. For an examination of the politics and policy implications of the closing of the public
domain, see P. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
(1960); W. CALEF, PRIvATE GRAZING AND PuBuc LANDS: STuDiEs OF LoCAL MANAGEMENT OF THE
TAYLOR GRAZING ACT (190); L. PEPPER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPOSALMAND
RESERVATION Poucms (1951).
19. Section 3 of the Taylor Grazing Act is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1988). The pertinent
parts of section 315b read as follows:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to issue or cause to be issued permits
to graze livestock on such grazing districts to such bona fide settlers, residents,
and other stock owners as under his rules and regulations are entitled to participate
in the use of the range, upon payment annually of reasonable fees in each case
to be fixed or determined from time to time in accordance with governing law....
Preference shall be given in the issuance of grazing permits to those within or near
a district who are landowners engaged in the livestock business, bona fide occupants
or settlers, or owners of water or water rights, as may be necessary to permit the
proper use of lands, water or water rights owned, occupied, or leased by them ....
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section 15.20 Pursuant to these provisions, the BLM conveys to livestock
graziers legally cognizable interests in the public lands. At the most
basic level, property is the right to possess or occupy a tangible and
identifiable object. 2' That grazing permittees and lessees have such a
right is undeniable, despite the assertion of both the standard BLM
permit and lease that they "convey[ ] no right, title or interest ...
in any lands or resources" owned by the federal government. 2 To the
contrary, this article shows that permittees and lessees acquire rights
of the kind that do constitute property.
These rights, however, are not exercised in a void. All lands administered
by the BLM are subject to the multiple use requirements of the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act. FLPMA directs the BLM to manage
its lands in ways that maintain in perpetuity "a high-level annual or
regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the public
lands consistent with multiple use." ' 23 These uses include outdoor recreation, range, mineral, and timber production, watershed and wildlife
habitat protection, and promotion of scenic, scientific and historic values.2
The BLM has taken this directive to mean "that all uses should be
allowed in all areas.' '25 Consequently, in any given grazing allotment,
the BLM may be trying to balance the contentious interests of many
different resource users. 26 In addition, the BLM's version of multiple use

Such permits shall be for a period of not more than ten years, subject to the
preference right of the permittees to renewal in the discretion of the Secretary of
Interior, who shall specify from time to time numbers of stock and seasons of
use.... So far as consistent with the purposes and provisions of this Subchapter,
grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately safeguarded,
but the creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit pursuant to the
provisions of this Subchapter shall not create any right, title, interest, or estate in
or to the lands.
20. Section 15 of the Taylor Grazing Act is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315m (1988). The pertinent
parts of section 315m read as follows:
The Secretary of the Interior is further authorized, in his discretion, where vacant,
unappropriated, and unreserved lands of the public domain are so situated as not
to justify the inclusion in any grazing district to be established pursuant to this
Subchapter, to lease such lands for grazing purposes, upon such terms and conditions
as the Secretary may prescribe: Provided, That preference shall be given to owners,
homesteaders, lessees, or other lawful occupants of contiguous lands to the extent
necessary to permit proper use of such contiguous lands ....
21. See generally Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985).
22. Standard permits and leases can be obtained from the BLM's Resource Area offices. Similar
rights-denying language is found in Section 3 of the Taylor Grazing Act. See supra note 19.
23. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(h) (1988). This is FLPMA's sustained yield mandate.
24. Id. § 1702(c). The BLM is required by FLPMA to accomplish this task by developing land
use management plans. See id. § 1712. The agency intends to prepare 136 of these Resource
Management Plans. For an example of a final plan covering almost 900,000 acres of central and
northern New Mexico, see U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, RIO PUERCO
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND RECORD OF DECISION (1986). Thirteen years after the enactment
of FLPMA, fewer than half of the projected plans have been completed. For a report on the
BLM's progress, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFCE, PUBLIC LANDS: LIMIED PROGRESS IN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANNING (1990).

25. Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning on the Federal Lands, 61 U. COLO.
L. REv. 307, 352 (1990).
26. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1985) (California Desert Conservation
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planning may impede good resource management by failing to "specify
areas more suited to some particular uses than to others. "27
For holders of grazing permits and leases, multiple use management
has consequences that are explored throughout this article. All property
rights are relational, but those that are embedded in a multiple use system
are more relational than others. The relational concept of property recognizes that any given right is a package of claims to occupy some
physical object, to use it in certain ways, and exclude certain identifiable
others from it. On public lands devoted to multiple uses, conflicting
rights are manifold. X's claims of entry, use and exclusion are circumscribed by the contending claims of Y, and vice versa. Permittee White's
claim to use an allotment may be limited by the mineral prospecting of
the proverbial grizzled oldtimer with his mule, or a modern cyanide
leachfield. This would be less likely in a regime of dominant rather than
multiple uses.
C. The Grazing Cases
From the permittee's perspective, the questions are what can be done
with the land and who can be excluded from it. Most of the reported
2
Taylor Grazing Act cases seek to answer these questions too. One group
deals with the character of the grazier's right of occupancy against the
BLM. The grazing lease and permit are "subject to (a) modification,
suspension, or cancellation as required by land use plans and applicable
law; [and] (b) annual review and to modification of terms and conditions
as appropriate." 2 9 But this emphatic language has to be qualified. Like
Area Management Plan); Headwaters, Inc. v. BLM, 684 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Or. 1988), vacated,
893 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1989) (Josephine Sustained Yield Unit Ten-Year Management Plan); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 677 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Mont. 1985), aff'd, 871 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1989)
(South Rosebud and Eastern Powder River Management Framework Plans); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1986), aff'd, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Reno Management Framework Plan). All of these cases involved challenges to BLM multiple use
decisions.
27. Coggins, supra note 25, at 352. George Coggins predicts that the BLM's insistence "on an
open-ended concept of multiple use management seems destined to fail. Planning, coupled with
allied 'zoning' processes of the federal lands, eventually will result in de facto dominant use
management regimes." Id. He suggests that special land designations will "progressively shrink the
land base open to all multiple uses." Id. An example is the BLM's habitat program for the desert
tortoise. See 55 Fed. Reg. 41,392 (1990) (closing approximately 37,000 acres in the Ridgecrest
Resource Area of California to several activities, including grazing).
28. Most academic commentary, on the other hand, is concerned with management issues. See
Coggins, supra note 25; Keiter, NEPA and the Emerging Concept of Ecosystem Management on
the Public Lands, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43 (1990); Braun, Emerging Limits on Federal Land
Management Discretion: Livestock, Riparian Ecosystems, and Clean Water Law, 17 ENVTL. L. 43
(1986); Coggins, Livestock Grazing on the Public Lands: Lessons From the Failure of Official
Conservation, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 749 (1984); Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management
V: Prescriptions for Reform, 14 ENVTL. L. 497 (1984); Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland
Management IV: FLMPA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1 (1983); Coggins,
The Law of Public Rangeland Management 11: A Survey of Creeping Regulation at the Periphery,
1934-1983, 13 ENVTL. L. 295 (1982); Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 17; Coggins, Evans
& Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management I: The Extent and Distribution
of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535 (1982). Analysis of the legal rights of permittees and lessees
is unsystematic and outdated. See Ragsdale, Section 3 Rights under the Taylor Grazing Act, 4 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 399 (1969); Kingery, The Public Grazing Lands, 43 DEN. U.L. REV. 329 (1966).
29. See sample permit and sample lease on file with the author.
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all federal agencies, the BLM provides a forum for administrative review
of field-level decisions.30 Beyond that, the federal courts provide judicial
review of the agency's final determinations. 3' The BLM cannot suspend
or cancel a permit for violation of a term or condition without giving
notice to the permittee and providing an opportunity for a hearing.32
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the agency may not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or abuse its discretion.33 At least to this limited
extent, the permittee's tenure is secure.
A second group of cases deals with the character of the permittee's
right of occupancy against private parties. The claims of permittees to
exclude others are far from absolute. In fact, these rights vary according
to the identity of the person the permittee might wish to exclude. Different

property rules cover the BLM grazier's relations with a host of other
individuals, including hardrock miners,34 non-BLM livestock operators,35
fishermen, hunters, and other recreational users,3 6 Indians,37 homesteaders 8

30. Administrative remedies are provided by 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.470, 4.476, 4160.4 (1990).
31. Judicial review is provided by FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(6) (1988) ("it is the policy of
the United States ... that judicial review of public land adjudication decisions be provided by
law") and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). For a case holding that
the cancellation of a grazing lease is subject to judicial review, see Diamond Ring Ranch v. Morton,
531 F.2d 1397, 1406 (10th Cir. 1976). Two earlier cases held that a BLM decision not to issue a
grazing permit is committed to the agency's discretion and thus exempt from judicial review. See
Mollohan v. Gray, 413 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1969); Sellas v. Kirk, 101 F. Supp. 237 (D. Nev. 1951).
See also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988) (providing that issues committed to agency discretion are not
reviewable). But these decisions have been implicitly reversed by FLPMA and Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In Overton Park, the Supreme Court held that the
agency discretion exception from judicial review is very narrow and applicable only when "statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply." Id. at 410. As this
article shows, the law of decision in grazing disputes is comprehensive.
32. See James C. Mackey, 96 I.B.L.A. 356 (Apr. 10, 1987). Although this case involved a BLM
cultural resource use permit, rather than a grazing permit, the holding seems to apply to BLM
permits of all types.
33. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988). For cases setting aside actions of the BLM, see Bunyard
v. Hodel, 702 F. Supp. 820 (D. Nev. 1988) (reversing a decision of the Interior Board of Land
Appeals interpreting agency regulation to require a proportionate share reduction of animal unit
months among permittees within grazing district), and Diamond Ring Ranch, 531 F.2d at 1397
(reversing a decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals suspending grazing permit for three
years). Animal unit months are discussed infra note 70.
34. See 43 U.S.C. § 315e (1988) (providing that BLM grazing districts are to remain open to
mineral discovery).
35. See, e.g., Elquist v. Rasmussen, 381 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1967) (defendant is liable in trespass
for the deliberate driving of his cattle onto lands occupied by another).
36. See 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1988) (providing that nothing in the Taylor Grazing Act is intended
to restrict the right to hunt or fish within a grazing district). For a case dealing with a negligence
claim maintained by an off-road motorcyclist against a United States Forest Service grazing lessee,
see Hubbard v. Brown, 50 Cal. 3d 189, 785 P.2d 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1990). The California
Supreme Court held that the state's recreational use statute immunized the lessee from liability.
The same statute would immunize BLM permittees and lessees.
37. See United States v. Dann, 873 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890 (1989)
(holding that holders of aboriginal title to an identified portion of the public domain may use the
land without obtaining the permission of the BLM).
38. Under the Desert Lands Act of 1877, the last of the homestead statutes in effect, individuals
can enter the public domain to locate and reclaim potential agricultural land. See 43 U.S.C. §§
321-339 (1988). For a case dealing with the conflicting rights of graziers and farmers, see Faulkner
v. Watt, 661 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1981).
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and cattle thieves.3 9 It may even be said that permittees have a separate
set of rights against freeranging pronghorns. 40 The legal claims and duties
that constitute these relations are multiplex.
D. Permits and Property Rights
Many courts have erroneously concluded that permits and leases do
not convey property interests. 4' Others have concluded, despite the language of the standard permit and lease to the contrary, that permittees
have property rights. 42 Affixing a traditional property label to their
interests is difficult. Yet, whether they be called easements, profits,
licenses, covenants or conditions, "while they exist they are something
I call these interests property
of real value to the possessors . . . . -143
be analyzed in terms of
cannot
they
that
insist
rights, but I do not
IV that the boundaries
Part
in
see
will
we
contract and tort as well. Indeed,
claims, duties,
Hohfeldian
porous.
are
tort
and
between property, contract
that cut
components
analytical
fundamental
are
no-claims
privileges and
categories.
law
private
across all
Disputes over the nature of grazing rights are likely to intensify in
coming years under the increasingly critical scrutiny of federal grazing

39. In most Western states, special criminal statutes deal with livestock rustling. See, e.g., Wyo.
STAT. § 6-3-402 (1989). In addition, the recordation of a certified brand is prima facie evidence of
ownership of a branded animal in a legal proceeding involving title. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 1120-108 (1989).
40. See United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 980 (1988) (requiring a permittee to lower fences to enable antelope to move to their winter
grounds).
41. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 489, (1973); Holland Livestock Ranch v. United
States, 655 F.2d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981); Diamond Ring Ranch v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397, 1404
(10th Cir. 1976); LaRue v. Udall, 324 F.2d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United States v. Cox, 190
F.2d 293, 294 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951); White.Sands Ranchers v. United States,
14 Cl. Ct. 559, 566, aff'd, 16 Cl. Ct. 13 (1988).
42. See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 177 (1955); Kidd v. United States Dep't of
Interior, 756 F.2d 1410, 1411 (9th Cir. 1985); Faulkner v. Watt, 661 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Morrell, 331 F.2d 498, 501 (10th Cir. 1964); McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931, 934
(D.C. Cir. 1960); Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738, 742 (10th Cir. 1949); Fallini v. Hodel,
725 F. Supp. 1113, 1117 (D. Nev. 1989); United States v. Achabal, 34 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Nev.
1940).
43. Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1938). The Red Canyon Sheep
Company had pastured livestock on the public domain for 25 years prior to the enactment of the
Taylor Grazing Act. Upon passage of the Act, the Secretary of the Interior issued a license to the
company permitting it to continue to pasture sheep on the land. One year later, however, the
Secretary proposed to exchange this land for a private parcel located a considerable distance away
from Red Canyon Sheep's home ranch. The court of appeals enjoined the exchange.
The court held that the Secretary's action would be "an illegal invasion of the asserted rights
of the [Red Canyon Sheep Company] which a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin." Red
Canyon Sheep, 98 F.2d at 322. The court relied on the close analogy between grazing rights in
public lands and appropriative rights in public waters, citing Luxen v. Town of Rifle, 100 Colo.
540, 69 P.2d 251 (1937) (equity protects an appropriator from diversion of creek by municipal
corporation). It noted that equitable protection is accorded to appropriative water rights even though
"the owner of a water right has a vested interest in ... something less than the full ownership
of property because it is a right not to the corpus of the water but to the use of the water." Red
Canyon Sheep, 98 F.2d at 315.
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policy." This ongoing policy debate is concerned with the sound management of our public range resources. Large portions of the BLM lands
are overgrazed. 45 The managerial goals of the BLM, however, are slowly
incorporating the restoration of biotic communities.4 The cowboy economy of the West, characterized by the unrestrained exploitation of natural
resources, is yielding as a matter of necessity to an economy based on
responsible and sustainable resource use. 47 The rights of permittees and
lessees will inevitably be redefined by this transformation. 48 Part IV
discusses the historical forces that shaped Western livestock trespass law.
Likewise, the law of the range will be reshaped by our own time's felt
necessities.4 9
II.

THE FEDERAL RANGE CODE

A.

Res Nullius and Res Publica
Before the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act the public domain was
a common-pool resource exploited under a common-property regime.
Common-pool resources include things like fisheries, groundwater reservoirs and migratory wildlife. Like these other common-pool resources,

44. Public interest groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council, the National Wildlife
Federation, the Public Lands Action Network, and Free Our Public Lands have announced their
intention to pressure the BLM to significantly curtail grazing on the public domain. The slogan of
Free Our Public Lands is "Cattle Free by '93!" The response of ranchers is "Cattle Galore by
'94!" See Riding Herd on the Range, SIERRA, Sept./Oct. 1990, at 44-45; see also NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE CoUNCLc, OUR AnrG PUBLIC RANGELANDS STILL AILINO: CONDITION REPORT (1989); Wuer-

thner, How the West Was Eaten, WILDERNEsS, Spring 1991, at 28; Fodderfor Thought, SIERRA,
Sept./Oct. 1990, at 49; Wuerthner, The Price is Wrong, SIERRA, Sept./Oct. 1990, at 38; Strickland,
Taking the Bull by the Horns, SmaA, Sept./Oct. 1990, at 46; Luoma, Discouraging Words, AUDUBON,
Sept. 1986, at 86. The National Audubon Society has produced a documentary film critical of
federal grazing policy titled The Next Range War (National Audubon Society Productions 1991).
45. See U.S.

ENVTL.

PROTECTION AGENCY,

LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON WESTERN RIPARIAN AREAS

(1990); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: MORE EMPHsASs NEEDED ON
DECLINING AND OVERSTOCKED GRAZING ALLOTMENTS (1988); HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS,
FEDERAL GRAZING PROGA.M: ALL Is NOT WELL ON THERANGE, H.R. REP. No. 593, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 593).
46. But see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC RANOELANDS: SOME RIPARIAN AREAS
RESTORED BUT WIDESPREAD IMPROVEMENT WILL BE SLOW (1988).
47. K. BOULDING, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in 3 COLLECTED PAPEaS 383
(F. Glahe ed. 1971). This passage from the cowboy economy underlies land use planning legislation
like FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1988) (imposing planning requirements on the BLM), and the
National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988) (imposing planning requirements on the
Forest Service). For an analysis of these statutes, see Coggins, supra note 25.
48. Cf. Corbin, Law and the Judges, 3 YALE RE. 234, 249 (1914):
[T]he growth of law is an evolutionary process. Its principles consist of such
generalizations as may tentatively be made from a vast number of individual
instances. The instances change as man and society change, with the climate, with
the growth of population, with the progress of invention, with social selection. And
as the instances change, so must our generalizations change. So must our idea of
justice change.
49. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). For a history of the Western livestock industry
focusing on the process of adaptation to the arid and treeless plains, with attention to the law of
the range prior to passage of the Taylor Grazing Act, see W. WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS 205-452
(1931).
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public grasslands are characterized by (1) the difficulty of regulating
access to them and (2) the adverse effects of exploitation by one user
on all the others.5 0 Prior to the Grazing Act, this had two results. The
first was a sometimes violent, often illegal and usually unsuccessful effort
by sheepmen and cattlemen to control the public ranges themselves."
The second was the massive degradation of the range and its resources.
The first manifestation of this degradation was the almost total destruction of the great buffalo herds of the Western plains by the mid1800s.52 After the buffalo were gone, farmers and ranchers made an
assault on the grass itself. By the time of the Taylor Grazing Act, prime
grazing lands had been severely degraded by overuse." Gullies and arroyos
had become a serious problem.54 According to Congressman Taylor, the
author of the Grazing Act,
on the Western slope of Colorado and in nearby States [there was]
waste, competition, overuse, and abuse of valuable range lands and
watersheds eating into the very heart of western economy. Farms and
ranches everywhere in the range country were suffering. The basic
economy of entire communities was threatened. There was terrific
strife and bloodshed between cattle and sheep men over the use of
the range. Valuable irrigation projects stood in danger of ultimate
deterioration. Erosion, yes human erosion, had taken root. The livecircumstances beyond its control, was headed
stock industry, through
55
for self-strangulation.

Much of this was attributable to the particular property regime that
governed, or failed to govern, these common resources.
This property regime was res nullius or open access. Entry onto the
public domain was unregulated and the use of the resources there was
free and open to everyone.56 The predictable result was that resources
were consumed at a rate higher than their sustainable yield. In a res
nullius regime, resource users have no reason to restrict their consumption
because the potential advantages of their behavior can be immediately

50. See Feeny, Berkes, McCay & Acheson, The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years
Later, 18 HUMAN ECOLOoY 3-4 (1990). For a fictionalized account of the problems created for
Western graziers by these common-pool resource characteristics, see I. DoIr, DANCING AT THE RASCAL
FAR (1987). See also A. McEvoy, THE FISHERMAN's PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA
FISHEES (1986).
51. See generally H. SuIT, THE WAR ON POWDER RIVER (1967).
52. See generally W. GARD, THE GREAT BUFFAO HUNT (1968). At least this is the first clear
manifestation in the historical record. But see Martin, CatastrophicExtinctions and Late Pleistocene
Blitzkrieg: Two Radiocarbon Tests, in ExTrNCTIONS 153 (M. Nitecki ed. 1984) (discussing the role
of human hunting pressures in the extinction of many large North American browsers).
53. For a survey of the condition of Western rangelands in the 1930s, see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
FOREST SERVICE, THE WESTERN RANGE: A GREAT BUT NEGLECTED NATURAL RESOURCE, S. Doc.
No. 199, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). According to the Forest Service, forage values on more than
half of the Western range had been reduced by more than half from their virgin conditions. Id.
at 3.
54. See Bailey, Epicycles of Erosion in the Valleys of the Colorado Plateau Province, 43 J.
GEOLOGY 337 (1935).
55. 86 CONG. REC. 4198 app. (1940) (statement of Rep. Taylor).
56. Feeny, Berkes, McCay & Acheson, supra note 50, at 4.
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garnered by someone else.57 Every animal removed from open range by
Grazier White is an inducement to Grazier Black to increase the size of
his herd. Knowing this, White has no incentive to reduce his herd, and
the long-term equilibrium of the resource is lost.
There are any number of mechanisms that restrict open access, but
there are only two basic types." One is by establishing a community
property regime. In res communes, established resource users agree among
themselves to allocate and limit their own consumption, and to keep
others out.5 9 Usually these regimes lack legal force, in the sense that the
government will not step in to enforce the terms of the agreement, though
they sometimes succeed anyway.60 Prior to the enactment of the Taylor
Grazing Act, this approach to common-resource problems characterized
the public domain. Examples of it were the illegal fencing of public lands
by private persons 6' and unsuccessful efforts to exclude latecomers by
private individuals and associations.6 2 Contemporary examples are the
sheep and cattle associations of Laguna Pueblo in New Mexico . 3
The second way to restrict open access is by establishing a public
property, or res publica, regime. 4 This, of course, is the way of the
Taylor Grazing Act. The government retains ownership of the property,
decides what resource uses will be allowed, who can have access, and
how much they can consume. The BLM makes all of these decisions
with respect to the lands it administers. Types of use in particular areas
are determined in the agency's multiple use plans; 65 allocation of userights to particular individuals is made through its grazing permit and
lease system. This is not to suggest that the Taylor Grazing Act has been
57. See Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J.
POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
58. For a collection of essays about various kinds of institutional arrangements, private and
public, for dealing with common-pool problems, see THE QuEsTIoN OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE
AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL REsouRCES (B. McCay & J. Acheson eds. 1987).
59. Feeny, Berkes, McCay & Acheson, supra note 50, at 4.
60. See, e.g., J. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988). In Maine's lobster grounds,
fishermen sometimes resort to violence to restrict entry by out-harbor lobstermen into their fishing
areas. What they perceive to be their "rights" are law in the sense that Adamson Hoebel uses the
term: norms that are enforced by the threat or fact of physical force by a group possessing the
socially recognized privilege of enforcement. See A. HOEBEL, supra note 15.
61. This led to the passage in 1885 of the Unlawful Enclosures of Public Lands Act establishing
c'iminal penalties for the erection of unlawful fences on the public domain. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 10611066 (1988). The difficulty of enforcing this law is described in Reynolds, Land Laws and Illegal
Fencing in Western Nebraska, 23 Acuuc. HISTORY 173 (1949). For a recent case involving the
Unlawful Enclosures Act, see United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir.
1988).
62. This effort is recorded in the following notice in a Montana newspaper:
We, the undersigned stock growers of the above described range [on the Musselshell
River], hereby give notice that we positively decline allowing any outside party, or
any party's herds upon the range, the use of our corrals nor will they be permitted
to join in any roundup on said range from and after this date.
Rocky Mountain Husbandman, July 19, 1883 (quoted in E. OSGOOD, THE DAY OF THE CATTLEMAN
185-86 (1929)).
63. C. EASTMAN & J. GRAY, CoMuNrTY GRAZING: PRACTICE AND POTENTIAL IN NEW MExICo

93-104 (1987).
64. Feeny, Berkes, McCay & Acheson, supra note 50, at 5.
65. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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6
notably successful in restoring public lands to good health. The BLM's
failure to deliver on the promises of the Act, however, is one of implementation rather than conception.

Permits and Leases
The substance of a permittee's or lessee's grazing entitlement is expressed
in a permit granted under. section 3 of the Taylor Grazing Act or a lease
granted under section 15.67 In terms of the rights they convey, however,
these instruments are not appreciably different. Both identify the grazing
allotment by name and number, 61 the starting and ending dates of the
69
grazing period, the percentage of use that is active, the number and
kind of authorized livestock, and the number of authorized animal unit
B.

months

70

These are the basic terms of BLM permits and leases. In theory, these
terms are designed to keep the number of grazing livestock within the
carrying capacity of the range. The BLM is to manage its lands under
principles of sustained yield. 7 According to the Public Rangelands Improvement Act, "the goal of such management shall be to improve the
range conditions of the public rangelands so that they become as productive as feasible .... "172 This directive requires that "no management
practice permanently impair the productive potential of the land, an
indirect way of saying no more overgrazing.' ' 73 Although the BLM has
yet to achieve this goal, the range code requires the agency to impose
ecologically sound permit and lease terms.
Grazing Allotments
The basic BLM management unit is the grazing allotment. Because
these units vary greatly in terms of climate, soil, vegetation and available
water, most management decisions are made at the allotment level. Allotments also vary greatly in size, from a few hundred acres to tens of
C.

66. The BLM issues an annual report on the condition of the lands it administers. Vegetation
in excellent condition is 76% to 100% similar to the potential natural climax plant community;
good condition is 51% to 75% similar; fair condition is 26% to 50% similar; and poor condition
is 0% to 25% similar. In 1989, 52% of the BLM's land was reported to be in fair and poor

condition. Only 3% was reported to be in excellent condition.

PUBliC LAND STATISTICS,

supra note

16, at 27.
67. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Permits relate to land that has been incorporated
in a grazing district. Leases relate to land that has not been incorporated. Grazing districts are
established by the Secretary of the Interior on lands that "in his opinion are chiefly valuable for
grazing or raising forage crops." Since almost 90% of BLM land suitable for grazing has been
incorporated in grazing districts, most grazing entitlements are permits.
68. Grazing allotments are discussed infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
69. Active use is discussed infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
70. The number of livestock permitted is expressed in terms of animal unit months. An animal
unit month is equivalent to "the amount of forage necessary for the sustenance of one cow or its
equivalent for a period of 1 month." 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1990). Five sheep are the equivalent
of one cow. The amount of forage these animals would eat in one month is between 700 and 800
pounds.
71. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1988).
72. Id. § 1903(b).
73. Coggins, Livestock Grazing on the Public Lands, supra note 28, at 760.
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thousands. In the smaller allotments, there may be only one permittee
or lessee, but most are large enough to provide forage for several. Indeed,
a few allotments are used by as many as fifty permittees.1 4 In these
group allotments, separate tracts are not fenced off and permittees or
lessees graze their livestock in common. This approach has been gaining
favor within the BLM because it allows movement of livestock away
from areas that are suffering temporary distress.7 5 With individual allotments, the agency does not have this flexibility.
For the graziers in a group allotment, however, the time and expense
of coordinating collective activities can constitute heavy transaction costs. 76
In a sense, a group allotment is an island of res communes in a sea of
res publica. All the graziers in a group allotment have rights of access
and use, though their particular allocations of the resource may be
unequal. One increased transaction cost in a common-resource area involves the identification of trespassers. In a BLM group allotment, this
cost may be increased even more by the fact that for some resource
users, for example, Indians acting under color of aboriginal title and
mineral prospectors acting in accordance with the federal Mining Law,"
BLM lands remain res nuius. To some extent, the BLM lands are held
in an overlapping and conflicting combination of the basic commonproperty regimes.
D. Active and Suspended Use
The grazing entitlement is expressed in terms of active and suspended
use. 7 Active use is the current authorized use based on the amount of
available forage. Suspended use is use that is temporarily withheld.
Suspension might be required, for example, when drought has temporarily
reduced the amount of forage available in the grazing district or leasehold.
The mix of active and suspended use is reflected in the permit or lease.
The BLM is required by FLPMA to administer livestock grazing on
the public domain in accordance with its land use plans.7 To do this,
the BLM must rely on range inventories and monitoring. A range inventory
collects data that allows description of range resources at a moment in
time. The inventory includes soil and ecological survey data. It identifies
"those specific physical site characteristics that make each area different
from others in its ability to produce vegetation and to respond to man-

74. W. CALEF, supra note 18, at 69.
75. One school of thought in range management is that Western grasslands can be intensively
grazed, as they once were by immense herds of buffalo, provided the animals move frequently to
allow regeneration. See, e.g., A. SAVORY, HOLtSTiC RESOURCE MANAOEMENT (1988).
76. C. EASTMAN & J. GRAY, supra note 63, at 14. Collective activities might include, for example,
the construction and maintenance of range improvements, care for the health of the herd, defense
against predators and calving.
77. These are the subjects of Part V.
78. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-2(a) (1988).
79. Id. § 1712.
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agement. '"80 Each inventory serves as a baseline for measuring changes
in range conditions.
Monitoring involves the collection of data on a periodic basis for
comparison with the baseline. The data includes information on the kinds
and numbers of livestock and wildlife that have used the allotment in
a specific period of time, the amount of forage they have consumed or
destroyed, the trend of the plant community, such as whether undesirable
plants have increased or decreased as a percentage of the community,
and the trend of climatic conditions."' The local BLM conservation officer
is required to periodically review the grazing preference and is authorized
to adjust it as2 "necessary to manage, maintain or improve rangeland
productivity."
The range code contains provisions authorizing the modification of
permits and leases to maintain or improve range conditions. If monitoring
discloses that the vegetation community is deteriorating, for example, a
portion of the grazing entitlement may be converted from active to
suspended use. Each grazing preference, in terms of animal unit months,
is established originally on the basis of historic use. Over 3time, however,
the BLM may adjust the mix of active and suspended use. If monitoring
shows that current livestock use has exceeded the carrying capacity of
the allotment, the conservation officer may reduce active use and hold
it in suspension.84
Alternatively, the range conservation officer may require a change in
the management practices of the permittee or lessee to achieve the BLM's
land use objectives. 5 She may demand, for example, the establishment
of a pasture rotation system or the erection of fences to reduce the
86
impact of livestock on riparian vegetation. Further, she may set forth
management plan. "87
"allotment
written
a
in
these management practices
This document, since it is automatically incorporated in the terms and
8
conditions of the permit or lease, is binding on the permittee or lessee.
Failure to abide by its provisions can result in loss of the grazing
entitlement.

80. Grazing Administration; Exclusive of Alaska, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,032, 19,033 (1987).
81. See id.at 19,033.
82. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.3 (1990). Unfortunately, the BLM lacks the human resources to comply
with this mandate. The General Accounting Office concluded in 1988 that the average BLM and
Forest Service range management officer was responsible for 22 grazing allotments covering 191,000
supra
acres. See MORE EMPHASIS NEEDED ON DECLINING AND OVERSTOCKED GRAZING ALLOTMENTS,
note 45, at 39. Consequently, regular monitoring of every allotment is impossible.
83. See Grazing Administration; Exclusive of Alaska, Amendments to the Grazing Regulations,
53 Fed. Reg. 10,224, 10,227 (1988).
84. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.3-2(b) to (c).
85. Id. § 4110.3-2(b).
86. See SoME RIPARIAN AREAS RESTORED BUT WIDESPREAD IMPROVEMENT WILL BE SLOW, supra
note 46, at 51.
87. 43 C.F.R. § 4120.2(a). According to a General Accounting Office report, fewer than half
of all allotments are subject to an allotment management plan. See MORE EMPHASIS NEEDED ON
DECLINING AND OVERSTOCKED GRAZING ALLOTMENTS,

88. 43 C.F.R. § 4120.2(c).

supra note 45, at 40-41.
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E.

Suspension and Cancellation
FLPMA authorizes the suspension or cancellation of a grazing permit
or lease, in whole or in part, for any violation of a grazing regulation,
permit or lease.8 9 For example, a permit may be canceled if the permittee
sprays defoliant on sagebrush without obtaining the permission of the
range conservation officer. 90 But the most common reason for suspension
or cancellation is grazing trespass. The range code defines grazing trespass
as allowing livestock to graze on BLM lands (1) without a permit or
lease, (2) in excess of the number of livestock authorized by a permit
or lease, (3) in an area or at a time different from the area or time
authorized, or (4) without markings or taggings required by the authorizing
BLM officer. 9'
From non-willful to repeated willful trespasses, the punishments are
progressively more harsh. For a non-willful trespass, the trespasser must
pay the commercial value of the forage consumed by the livestock. 92
Commercial value is the average charge per animal unit month for
pasturing livestock on private grazing land in the eleven Western states.
The BLM determines the number of animal unit months in trespass and
multiplies this number by the current private grazing rate. 93 The penalty
for a willful trespass is twice the commercial value of the forage consumed. 94 The penalty for repeated willful trespasses is three times the
forage. 95 In addition, if the trespass is willful, the BLM may impound
and dispose of the animals. 96
F.

Transfers and Subleases
BLM permits and leases purport to convey no "right, title or interest"
in the land. 97 Obviously, this statement does not mean all that it says.
For example, permits and leases are frequently sold by their holders just
like other forms of alienable property. 9 These transactions take place in
the context of a sale of the holder's base property or home ranch. 99 The
89. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a) (1988); see also 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-1 (1990). Although this regulation
does not expressly state that violation of the terms of a permit or lease may be grounds for
suspension or cancellation, it cannot be read to limit the reach of the controlling statute.
90. Diamond Ring Ranch v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397, 1407 (10th Cir. 1976). "Cutting, burning,
spraying, destroying, or removing vegetation without authorization" is prohibited by the range code.
See 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(b)(3) (1990).
91. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4130.5(c), 4140.1(b)(1).
92. Id. § 4150.3(b).
93. See, e.g., BLM v. Ross Babcock, 84 I.D. 475 (1977).
94. 43 C.F.R. § 4150.3(b) (1990). In addition, the BLM may charge the costs of detecting,
investigating and resolving the trespass.
95. Id. § 4150.3(c).
96. Id. § 4150.4-1 to 4150.4-5.
97. See sample permit and lease on file with the author.
98. For a study of the market for permits and leases, see J. FOWLER & J. GRAY, GRAZINGLAND VALUES IN NEW MEXICO (1981).
99. The ownership or control of base property is a requirement of eligibility for a BLM lease
or permit. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1 (1990). For a lease, the base property must be "contiguous land,
or noncontiguous land when no applicant owns or controls contiguous land, used in conjunction
with a livestock operation which utilizes public lands outside a grazing district." Id. § 4110.2-1(a)(2).
For a permit, it must be "a base for a livestock operation which utilizes public lands within a
grazing district." Id. § 4110.2-1(a)(1).
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value of the grazing entitlement is added to the sale price. In effect, the
seller gains the difference between the market value of the grazing entitlement and the grazing fee.' ® If the purchaser of the base property is
otherwise qualified to hold a grazing permit or lease,' 0' he can obtain
a transfer of the original entitlement from the BLM. 0 2
The BLM makes no effort to capture the difference between the
commercial value of a grazing permit or lease and the grazing fee in a
sale of base property. It could only do so by raising the grazing fee to
a commercial level. 03 But the agency does attempt to prevent similar
windfalls that would accrue from the leasing of base property.'04 It does
so by prohibiting subleasing agreements that either allow (1) someone
other than the permittee or lessee to graze livestock without controlling
the base property or (2) grazing by livestock that are not owned or
controlled by the permittee or lessee. 05 The intention is to prevent permittees and lessees from realizing windfall profits from their entitlements
by assigning them for more money than they paid for them.' °6
G.

Conclusion
The Taylor Grazing Act supplies the primary law of the federal range.
Disputes arising under state laws of livestock trespass, the law of aboriginal
title, the mining law and other bodies of law are played out against the
background of the Grazing Act. Permits and leases awarded under the
range code give permittees and lessees a number of specific property
rights. However, provisions like those just discussed allowing suspension
of active use, imposition of allotment management plans, modification
of terms, and unilateral cancellation of permits and leases make graziers'
rights, at least against the BLM, relatively weak.
Yet even a system of weak property rights serves at least two important
functions. One is to provide an authoritative resolution of the conflicts

100. A grazing fee is charged each permittee and lessee. Id. § 4170.1-1. The amount of the fee
is supposed to equal the fair market value of the forage. Id. § 4130.7-1. The formula for calculating
grazing fees has been criticized, however, for yielding fees that are far less than fair market value.
See, e.g., Wuerthner, How the West was Eaten, supra note 44, at 38. The author claims that the
$36 million paid in grazing fees in 1989 "works out to about one sixth to one eighth as much as
they might have paid to lease equivalent private land." He also claims that these fees "covered
less than 45 percent of the federal costs of range management and improvement." See also U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RANGELAND

MANAGEMENT: CURRENT FORMULA KEEPS GRAZING FEES

Low 12 (1991).
101. In addition to owning or controlling base property, the holder of a BLM permit or lease
must be engaged in the livestock business, be a United States citizen or petitioner for naturalization,
or be an association or corporation qualified to conduct business in the relevant state. 43 C.F.R.
§ 4110.2-1(a)(2).
102. Id. § 4110.2-3(a).
103. In its 1991 study of the grazing fee formula, the General Accounting Office found that the
private lease rates exceeded $8 per animal unit month. The BLM grazing fee was $1.97 per animal
unit month. See RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: CURRENT FORMULA KEEPS GRAZING FEES Low, supra
note 100, at 12.
104. 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(a)(6) (1990).
105. Id. § 4100.0-5.
106. For a discussion of the rationale for this prohibition, see H.R. REP. No. 593, supra note
45, at 12-19.
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that inevitably arise in relational settings. On the range these relations
are between permittees, lessees, neighboring ranchers, recreational users
and a host of others. A second function is to coordinate and facilitate
the purposive interactions of these same individuals. 0 7 The remainder of
this article focuses on Taylor Grazing Act cases, some of them hypothetical, to delineate the Hohfeldian claims and duties that permittees
and lessees may assert and have asserted against them in conflicts arising
from their instrumental use of grazing resources.
III.

HOHFELD ON PROPERTY

The eight fundamental legal concepts identified by Hohfeld consist of
four positive entitlements-claims, privileges, powers, and immunitiesand their correlatives-no-claims, duties, disabilities, and liabilities. 0 8
Hohfeld arranges these terms in the following chart, with entitlements
in the upper row, and their correlatives beneath them:' °9
Jural Correlatives
claim

privilege

power

immunity

duty

no-claim

liability

disability

Entitlements are positive capacities. They give their holders the power
to take some specific action. They carry correlatives because rights are
relational. As Hohfeld explains, where X has a claim that Y should stay
off land that X has the privilege of entering, "the correlative of X's
[claim] that Y shall not enter on the land is Y's duty not to enter; [and]
the correlative of X's privilege of entering himself is manifestly Y's [noclaim] that X shall not enter.""10 There would be no point in saying that
X has a claim or privilege without specifying how those capacities relate
to some other person. In this case, because X has a claim and privilege

107. Law does not always successfully fulfill these functions. But its failure can be as illuminating
as its success. Consider the marital law of the Eskimo. Although the concept of marriage exists
among the Eskimo, there is no clear sign that a given marriage has either begun or ended. According
to Adamson Hoebel, there are "no cultural devices signalizing marriage in such a way as to keep
out trespassers." A. HOEHEL, supra note 15, at 84. The result is a high level of homicide attributable
to sexual jealousy. The problem of keeping out "trespassers" also led to a fair amount of violence
on the free-access public domain. See, e.g.,H. SMITH, supra note 51 (describing the "Johnson
County War" between rival cattlemen that erupted in Wyoming in 1892).
108. Hohfeld I, supra note 9, at 30. Although Hohfeld uses the terms right and claim interchangeably, it is better to distinguish between his limited definition of a claim and the more general
concept of a right. A claim represents the power of one person to secure a legal judgment against
another. A right may be any one of the four positive entitlements: a claim, privilege, power, or
immunity. For good introductions to Hohfeld's system, see Goble, A Redefinition of Basic Legal
Terms, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 540 (1935); Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J.
163, 170-71 (1919).
109. Hohfeld I, supra note 9, at 30.
110. Id. at 33.
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in relation to Y, Y can neither enter the land himself nor prevent X
from doing so.
Hohfeld's juristic terms are of two types. One set-power, liability,
disability, and immunity-refers to changes in legal relations associated
with operative facts." 1 The other-claim, duty, no-claim, and privilegerefers to the judgments of courts. The second of these sets of terms is2

relatively manageable because the number of outcomes is limited to two."
A court either grants a remedy or denies it. The claim/duty relation
arises in a situation in which the court will grant a remedy. That is,

plaintiff's claim is the defendant's duty. Conversely, the no-claim/privilege
relation arises in a situation in which the court will deny a remedy. The
plaintiff's no-claim is the defendant's privilege.
I focus on this second set of legal relations because the rights of
permittees and lessees are connected "ultimately to the 'ultimate legal

effects' of granting and denying remedial judgments.""

3

Hohfeld would

undoubtedly agree with Holmes that "a legal duty so called is nothing
but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be
made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court;-and so
of a legal right.1" 4 Always these sets of claims and duties, no-claims
and privileges, are between two distinct individuals. The statement "X
has a privilege" entails the additional statement "Y has a no-claim."

But X and Y are not abstractions. They are real people with definite
legal advantages and disadvantages.
Of course, a type of claim or privilege may operate against a large
group of other persons. Hohfeld calls such rights "multital." If A has
a multital claim, "not only B but also a great many other persons[though] not necessarily all persons-are under a duty . . . not to enter
on A's land.""' 5 A's claim against B may be "simply one of A's class

111. An operative fact is one "which, under the general legal rules that are applicable, suffice[s]
to change legal relations; that is, either to create a new relation, extinguish an old one, or perform
both of these functions simultaneously." Hohfeld I, supra note 9, at 25; see also Corbin, supra
note 108, at 164.
112. Power/liability and immunity/disability relations, on the other hand, are endlessly complex.
Indeed, an operative fact may affect the legal relations of persons who are not even directly involved.
Suppose, for example, that Grazier White subleased his allotment to Grazier Black. This operative
fact would not only affect legal relations between White and Black, but also between Black and
the BLM's Range Conservation Officer, who would have a claim against Black for the forage his
livestock consumed in the allotment. Hohfeld illustrates this feature of operative acts by reference
to the law of agency. Agents have the power to create legal relations between their principals and
third parties. Hohfeld I, supra note 9, at 46. Itemizing the -potential effects of operative facts on
legal relations even within a small field like the law of the range is difficult "not because it is
hard to understand, but because the detail becomes so overwhelmingly intricate .... " Cullison, A
Review of Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Concepts, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L.R. 559, 573 (1967).
113. Cullison, supra note 112, at 573; cf. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 11, at 83 ("[A] right is
best measured by effects in life. Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of remedy is defect
of right.").
114. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897). Hohfeld would also
agree with Holmes that "[s]uch words as 'right' are a constant solicitation to fallacy." Jackman
v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922); cf. Hohfeld I, supra note 9, at 33 n.34 (citing "merely
a few out of numberless judicial instances of ... loose usage [of the term] right").
115. Hohfeld 1I, supra note 9, at 719. Hohfeld distinguishes multital rights from those that are
paucital, or those possessed against only one other person. Id. at 716-17.
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of similar, though separate, [claims] actual or potential, against very

many persons." 6 Consider the multital claims of BLM permittees and
lessees. A permittee grazing cattle in a group allotment has potential
trespass claims against neighboring ranchers who do not have permits to

enter the allotment. However, these claims are not universal since they
7
do not reach other graziers who do have permits to enter the allotment."
A.

Claims

Assume that Grazier White runs cattle on an individual BLM allotment
under a section 15 lease. On the perimeter of the area, he posts notices
that he will consider entry onto the tract by any other person to be
trespassing."' White has done what people with property do so often.
He has grasped, marked, and used the tract of land specified in the

lease. 1 9 Assume further, however, that Grazier Black ignores White's
trespassing notices and turns his cattle into the allotment. And, at about
the same time, the BLM Range Conservation Officer enters the leasehold
to monitor the impact of grazing on the vegetation. She discovers to her
dismay that perennial grasses are being replaced by rabbit brush, horse
brush, Mormon tea, and other shrubs associated with overgrazing. 120 She
tells White that if the range continues to deteriorate he may have to
2
remove some of his cattle.' '

By posting his allotment with trespassing notices, Grazier White dem-

onstrates to others his belief in his claims and their duties. And, indeed,
if White were to sue Grazier Black for trespass in the local trial court,

he would win. Moreover, White's potential trespass claims are multital.
There are innumerable other persons, in addition to Black, who are
susceptible to being transformed into trespassers by White. These might
include other ranchers, mineral prospectors, and so on. A claim is the
right "to initiate that sequential combination of ... acts involved in
obtaining a judgment against another person."' 22 In Hohfeld's terms,
Black and others potentially subject to White's trespass claims have
23
correlative duties.

116. Id. at 719. It is traditional to distinguish between actions in rem and actions in personam
by calling the former an action against a thing and the latter an action against a person. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (5th ed. 1979). It is better, however, to think of an action in rem
as one brought to enforce a multital claim against a class of other persons.
117. Of course, some claims may be universal. For example, a suit brought to remove a cloud
on title involves a claim against the entire world of other persons.
118. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1988).
119. Cf. S. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 70 (1990).
120. From the looks of things, this allotment is probably in Nevada. See West, Intermountain

Deserts, Shrub Steppes, and Woodlands, in

NORTH AMERICAN TERRESTRIAL VEGETATION

210, 215

(M. Barbour & W. Billings eds. 1988).
121. In addition, of course, she tells Grazier Black that he must remove his cattle immediately.
Because they are in grazing trespass, she also notifies him that unless he does so by a specified
date, she will impound and dispose of them. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
122. Goble, supra note 108, at 540.
123. Again, however, multital claims are not necessarily universal. Grazier White would not prevail
on a trespass claim against the BLM Range Conservation Officer monitoring the range's condition.
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B.

Duties
In Hohfeld's perspective, the boundary between tort and property is
artificial. One part of Grazier White's property right is an actual tort
claim against Grazier Black, and a potential multital tort claim against
numerous others. Indeed, the central issue in most of the grazing cases
discussed in Part IV is trespass. But the boundary between property and
contract is no more natural.' 24 In essence, a grazing permit is a contract.
It contains numerous contractual duties running from the holder to the
BLM, some expressly set forth in the permit and some incorporated by
reference from the range code or an allotment management plan. One
of these contractual duties is not to commit grazing trespass. 25 Others
involve the permittee's basic duty to comply with the range management
plans of the agency.
Suppose, for example, the Range Conservation Officer has found that
native perennial fescues, wheatgrasses, wildryes, and needlegrasses have
sharply declined relative to exotic annuals and woody shrubs. Some of
these invaders, like the exotic halogetan glomeratus, cause desertification
by pumping salts and impeding water infiltration. 26 The vegetation changes
in White's allotment are evidence of severe overgrazing.' 2 7 If the Range
Conservation Officer requires White to reduce the number of his cattle
grazing on the allotment, or to put them on some type of pasture rotation
system, it is because the grazing lease establishes a contractual duty on
White's part to comply with the BLM's range management directives.
And if White is reluctant to do his duty, the Range Conservation Officer
has a contractual claim to enforce the terms of the lease.
C. No-Claims
In addition, property rights frequently include the power to convey
the rights themselves, in whole or in part, by contractual agreement. To
Hohfeld, a power is X's capacity to change the legal status of y.128 If
X conveys property rights to Y, X changes the legal status of Y by

124. In fact, the boundary between tort and contract is not all that distinct either. Consider, for
example, grazing trespass against the BLM. As has been noted, the damages for grazing trespass
are related to the value of the forage consumed by the unauthorized livestock. See supra notes 9497 and accompanying text. This is not, of course, the traditional common law measure of trespass
damages, which is the loss of market value attributable to the trespass. Instead, the BLM's grazing
trespass damage measure is the common law measure of assumpsit damages, the reasonable value
of use and occupation. Traditionally, assumpsit is a cause of action on an implied promise, a
contract remedy. The theory is that had the parties had a contractual agreement allowing the
defendant to make use of the resources of the plaintiff, they would have agreed to compensation
for the reasonable value of their use. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586
(5th Cir. 1957) (holding that defendant was liable in assumpsit rather than trespass for wrongful
exploration for oil on the plaintiff's mineral estate, and awarding damages based on the value of
defendant's use rather than loss of market value, which was negligible).
125. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
126. See West, supra note 120, at 217-21.
127. With their lower annual seed production, perennial grasses cannot compete with annuals
where there is overgrazing. Woody shrubs increase because they are relatively unpalatable.
128. Hohfeld I, supra note 9, at 45-46.
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making him an owner of a fee, a joint tenant, a remainderman, or the
new occupant of some other legal status. To a limited extent, this power
resides in BLM permittees and lessees. We have seen that the seller of
base property can, in effect, convey an attached grazing permit to the
buyer. 129 But we have also seen that a conveyance of grazing rights by
subleasing is prohibited. 310 This prohibition illustrates Hohfeld's concept
of no-claims and privileges.
Assume that Grazier White were to offer to lease to Grazier Black
the base property supporting his grazing lease. White thus changes Black's
legal status by putting him into a position to accept the offer and form
a contract setting forth the terms of the lease. To Hohfeld, the two
ranchers have a power-liability relationship. 3' White's power is not equivalent to a claim, however, for he cannot "initiate that sequential combination of ... acts involved in obtaining a judgment against [Black].' ' 3 2
No court would require that Black accept White's offer. It is, of course,
a basic principle of the law of contracts that an offeror cannot compel
an offeree to accept. Were it otherwise, the world of contractual relations
33
would be harsh indeed.
Hohfeld would say that White has a no-claim. Suppose, however, that
Grazier Black were to accept Grazier White's offer to lease the allotment.
The two neighbors would enter into an agreement under which Black
would pay White for the right to graze his cattle in the allotment. But
because the range code expressly prohibits subleasing, 34 this agreement
would be void. Neither White nor Black could enforce its terms or get
damages for breach. Again, Hohfeld would express this in a positive
way by saying that both White and Black have no-claims arising in
contract. Black, however, may have a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation arising from White's invalid offer.
D. Privileges
If a claim is one person's legal advantage against another, a privilege
is freedom from such an advantage. If there is no remedy for breach
of an agreement to sublease a grazing permit, because the range code
makes these agreements void, both parties to the agreement are privileged.
A privilege, of course, can be either a privilege to do a thing or not to
do it. In this case, both Grazier White and Grazier Black have a privilege
*not to carry out their sublease agreement. This type of privilege is common
in the law of contracts. It covers, for example, persons who promise to

129. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
131. Hohfeld's definition of liability is not legal responsibility or obligation, but subjectivity to
the power of another to change a legal relation. See Hohfeld I, supra note 9, at 54 n.90.
132. Goble, supra note 108, at 540.
133. Cf. Corbin, Jural Relations and their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 230-31 (1920)
(explaining Hohfeld's analysis in terms of the contract law of offer and acceptance).
134. This arrangement between Graziers White and Black would constitute subleasing because it
would allow grazing by livestock not owned or controlled by the lessee, White. See supra note 105
and accompanying text.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

make a gift,'3 5 who are affected by a mental infirmity, 3 6 or who enter
into a contract against public policy.3 7 White's promise to assign'his
grazing permit to Black is an agreement that is void on public policy
grounds set forth in the range code. 3 s
Just as duties are correlative to claims, privileges are correlative to
no-claims. Because Permittee White has no-claim to enforce the sublease
agreement, Black has the privilege of ignoring it. And vice versa. But
if Black has a claim for fraud in the offer of a sublease, White has a
duty. This is to say that White does not have the privilege to go around
making fraudulent misrepresentations. We will see in Part IV, however,
that people often do have the privilege of harming others. This fact,
captured in the phrase damnum absqua injuria,3 9 is proof of the contention that claims and privileges are just what the government will
enforce at any given moment. There is no ahistorical principle to account
for the fact that the government will punish the doing of some harms
and ignore the doing of others, which may be even more severe.
E.

Conclusion
In part III, the focus has been on rights of entry, use and profit held
by BLM permittees and lessees. The rights are composed of various
privileges and claims, such as a permittee's basic privilege to allow his
livestock to consume the forage on his assigned allotment. These privileges
and claims, however, are limited by the terms of the permit and, in
some cases, of an allotment management plan. Moreover, permit terms
and management plans are subject to ongoing adjustment as the BLM
attempts to respond to a congressional mandate to restore the biotic
health of the public range. 14° These limitations are Hohfeldian duties that
give rise to the correlative claims of the BLM. For example, failure of
a permittee to meet these duties4 may raise a claim for suspension or
cancellation of the permit itself.' '
In addition, the BLM's prohibition against a transfer of grazing rights
to another individual by subleasing is equivalent to a Hohfeldian noclaim to enforce a contractual agreement. 42 Inherent in this no-claim is
a correlative privilege to repudiate the deal. If Permittee White has noclaim to enforce a sublease against Grazier Black, Black would have a

135. See, e.g., Fischer v. Union Trust Co., 138 Mich. 612, 101 N.W. 852 (1904) (holding that
father's promise to sell his farm to his daughter for $1 was unenforceable).
136. See, e.g., Ruffini v. Avara, 121 Colo. 567, 220 P.2d 355 (1950) (holding that a contract
made by a rancher described as being "in the upper moron level" was unenforceable).
137. See, e.g., McLain v. Oklahoma Cotton Growers' Ass'n, 125 Okla. 264, 258 P. 269 (1927)
(holding that contract of association that violated the law under which the association was organized
was unenforceable).
138. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
139. The meaning of this ancient phrase is that a harm "does not give rise to an action for
damages against the person causing it." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 354 (5th ed. 1979).
140. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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privilege to disavow their agreement. In fact, each party to a sublease
would have a no-claim of enforcement and a privilege of disavowal.
Neither White nor Black could enforce a contract and both could renounce
it. Moreover, the invalidity of a sublease would give the BLM a claim
to oust both White and Black. The deal would be, in Hohfeld's terms,
an operative fact creatIng and destroying legal relations. White's original
rights of entry, use a/id profit would disappear.
In Part IV, the fo'us is on rights of exclusion rather than rights of
entry, use and profit. However, any right of exclusion, unless it is absolute
and universal, must accommodate conflicting rights of entry. The difference between a claim and a duty is a matter of perspective. What X
sees as a claim for trespass, Y sees as a duty not to trespass. But if
X's claim is not absolute, Y's may have, in some circumstances, a right
of entry herself. Y may have a conditional privilege of use and profit
enforceable against X. The livestock trespass, aboriginal title and mining
law disputes discussed in Part IV involve just this sort of problem. Like
most legal disputes, these are mixtures of law and fact. First, does Y
have a privilege of use in some circumstances, limiting X's claim of
exclusion? Second, do these circumstances exist?
IV.

CLAIMS OF EXCLUSION

The right of property is often said to be comprised of a certain number
of sticks in a bundle. 43 Traditionally, these sticks are identified as the
rights of possession, exclusion, disposition, use and enjoyment of profits.,"
The Taylor Grazing Act provides most of the sticks in the grazing
permittee's bundle. The Act establishes a claim of possession, a privilege
of use, and a claim to profits during the term of the permit. These are
Hohfeldian claims and privileges enforceable under the Grazing Act. One
of the sticks in the bundle, however, the right to exclude others, is
primarily a matter of state law. This is the law of livestock trespass.
Livestock trespass is different from grazing trespass, 45 which is actionable
by the BLM under the Grazing Act. Livestock trespass is actionable by
the BLM permittee herself.
The Evolution of Livestock Trespass
The ancient common law rule that livestock owners are strictly liable
for damages done by their trespassing animals146 was not uniformly
received in this country. In its stead, many states adopted the rule that
animals running at large on open range do not trespass when they enter
A.

143. See, e.g., S. MUNZER, supra note 119, at 23; R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 127-28 (1959).
144. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 333 (2d ed. 1975). It is possible, of
course, to have a property interest without holding all of these sticks. For example, the common
law's entailed fee could not be sold, devised or encumbered for a period longer than the lifetime
of the owner. See id. at 45-50.
145. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
146. See Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARv. L. REv. 441, 451 n.l
(1894) (strict liability for cattle trespass in England dates to the thirteenth century).
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another's lands. 147 The negligence or even willful disregard of the livestock
owner was immaterial. Because he was under no duty to restrain his
livestock from wandering, he could not be held liable for any damages
they might do. When this rule was adopted, however, the range was
truly open. 148 Cattle roamed at will under little supervision and care, with
the inevitable result that they strayed upon the private lands of others.
But, in the words of the Supreme Court of Colorado, "the duty of
protecting crops [was] placed upon the farmer." 49 It was not the livestock
owner who bore the cost of any injury roaming livestock might do, but
the person harmed. 15 0
This situation was bound to change, though not without a conflict
that was "violent and sanguinary, between fence men and no-fence
men."'' The public domain attracted thousands of farmers, 5 ' townsfolk,"13 and, after the invention of barbed wire in 1874, ranchers determined to fence the open range. 5 4 The resulting pressures led to the
modification of livestock trespass law. As the population of the Western
states grew and diversified, courts and legislatures created exceptions to
the Hohfeldian privileges provided livestock operators by the open range
trespass law.' 55 In addition, some state legislatures allowed localities to

147. See, e.g., Morris v. Fraker, 5 Colo. 425 (1880); Sprague v. Freemont, 6 Dak. 86, 50 N.W.
617 (1888); Johnson v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 7 Idaho 355, 63 P. 112 (1900); Fant v. Lyman,
9 Mont. 61, 22 P. 120 (1889); Delaney v. Errickson, 10 Neb. 492, 6 N.W. 600 (1880); Chase v.
Chase, 15 Nev. 259 (1880); Hecht v. Harrison, 5 Wyo. 279, 40 P. 306 (1895). These cases merely
recognized what had become the established custom of the range. See generally 3 F. HARPER, F.
JAMEs & 0. GRY, THE LAW OF TORTS 248-58 (2d ed. 1986).
148. This was the time of the overland cattle drives from the southern plains, superior for breeding,
to the northern plains, superior for fattening. From the end of the Civil War until the mid-1880s,
the range cattle industry expanded almost exponentially. "But by 1885 the time of reckoning had
come. Overstocking the range had so reduced the grass that either a drought or a hard winter
would bring disaster." W. WEBa, supra note 49, at 237. The southern and northern plains got
both. Between 1885 and 1887, cattle died in massive numbers. Nevertheless, by 1898 an association
of West Texans had recovered its optimism enough to adopt this statement: "Resolved, that none
of us know, or care to know, anything about grasses, native or otherwise, outside the fact that
for the present there are lots of them, the best on record, and we are -after getting the most out
of them while they last." Quoted in D. FLOnES, CAPROCK CANYONLJANDS: JOURNEYS INTO THE HEART
OF THE SOUTHERN PLsAiS 93 (1990).

149. Schaefer v. Mills, 72 Colo. 82, 209 P. 643, 644 (1922).
150. This is an example of damnum absque injuria. See note supra 139 and accompanying text.
151. W. WEan, supra note 49, at 313. These were the fence-cutter wars that broke out "wherever
men began to fence and make private what hitherto had been free land and grass." Id.
152. Between 1862 and 1885, homesteaders made over 400,000 entries on the public domain. See
Scott, The Range Cattle Industry: Its Effect on Western Land Law, 28 MONT. L. REV. 155, 15758 (1967).
153. Cattle freely roamed the streets of Denver until 1874 when a city ordinance permitted the
impoundment of strays. Id. at 178.
154. For a discussion of the impact of the invention and introduction of barbed wire, see W.
WEBn, supra note 49, at 295-318.
155. Robert Ellickson posits that as long as there were more graziers than farmers, the open
range rule was probably more efficient than the common law rule. He says that
it was cheaper to install fencing around the rare field crops than around the
ubiquitous grazing areas. Cattlemen running animals at large would have incurred
high transaction costs in organizing to erect fences that would reduce their common
risk of tort liability; in contrast, because a single farmer could decide on his own
whether or not to fence, he would incur lower transaction costs. If efficiency-
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districts within which
opt out of the open range law entirely by creating
15 6
the traditional common law rule would operate.
First, Western courts developed an exception to the open range law
by imposing liability on owners of livestock who had willfully driven
them onto another's land.5 7 The courts held that livestock owners could
not intentionally run their animals on the lands of another without paying
for the forage they consumed. 58 In some cases, plaintiffs were allowed
to prove willful intent by showing that the defendant placed his livestock
in a situation in which they were substantially certain to trespass. For
example, if a landowner grazed more livestock than his pasture could
support, so that the animals were forced to move to other pastures to
sustain themselves, the trespass would be willful.5 9 These restrictions on
open range law imposed some Hohfeldian duties on livestock operators,
but they still were privileged to commit non-willful trespasses.
Next, Western legislatures enacted fencing-out statutes.160 Although these
measures differ in detail, they generally provide that victims of animal
trespass have claims for damages if they have erected lawful fences.' 6'

minded frontier lawmakers assumed that actors knew and honored legal rules, they
therefore would have imposed the risk of trespass across an unfenced boundary
on the farmer, the cheaper avoider of trespass damages to isolated fields of crops.
Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN.
L. REv. 623, 660 n.95 (1986); cf. Coggins, Evans & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 28, at 549
("states typically encouraged overgrazing by enacting perverse trespass laws that allowed cattle to
graze free of liability on all unfenced areas") (citation omitted).
156. This evolution replayed the legal history of many Eastern states that first rejected the common
law rule and then reinstated it. The first livestock industry in the East, the cowpens systems, was
based on access to open range. See R. VANCE, HUMAN GEOGRAPHv OF THE SOUTH: A STUDY IN
REGIONAL RESOURCES AND HUMAN ADEQUACY 146-49 (2d ed. 1935). After the passing of the frontier
in the Eastern states, however, open range was closed entirely. See, e.g., Comment, Fencing Laws
in Missouri-Restraining Animals, 32 Mo. L. REV. 519 (1967).
157. See, e.g., Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81 (1894); Bell v. Gonzales, 35 Colo. 138, 83 P.
639 (1905); Swanson v. Groat, 12 Idaho 148, 85 P. 384 (1906); Musselshell Cattle Co. v. Woolfolk,
34 Mont. 126, 85 P. 874 (1906); Gutierrez v. Montosa Sheep Co., 25 N.M. 540, 185 P. 273 (1919);
Jones v. Blythe, 33 Utah 362, 93 P. 994 (1908).
158. See, e.g., Delaney v. Errickson, 11 Neb. 533, 10 N.W. 451 (1881). Note, again, that this
measure of damages is in the nature of assumpsit, an implied contract between the trespasser and
the plaintiff pursuant to which the defendant would pay for the value of his use.
159. See, e.g., Hill v. Chappel Bros., 93 Mont. 92, 18 P.2d 1106 (1932); Wright v. Atkinson,
39 N.M. 307, 46 P.2d 667 (1935). But see Richards v. Sanderson, 39 Colo. 270, 89 P. 769, 771
(1907) (livestock owner is under no duty to prevent natural wandering); Haskins v. Andrews, 12
Wyo. 458, 76 P. 588 (1904) (overstocking alone is not evidence of willfulness). Haskins suggests,
however, that in connection with other acts, overstocking could show willfulness.
160. See, e.g., Axuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-1426 to -1428 (Supp. 1990); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC.
CODE § 17121 (West 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 35-46-101 to -115 (1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 25-2201
to -2211 (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 814-215 to -217 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 569.440 to
.450 (1986); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 608.015 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 4-25-7 to -8 (Supp.
1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 16.60.015 (Supp. 1986); WYO. STAT. § 11-28-102 (1989). Precedents
for these statutes date to the colonial era. See W. CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS,
COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEw ENGLAND 134-35 (1983) (discussing statutes of the Massachusetts
Bay and Plymouth colonies requiring farmers to fence livestock out of their corn fields).
161. Most of the statutes define a lawful fence in very particular terms. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 81-4-101 (1990) (if made of barbed wire, there must be three strands and the lowest must be
between 15 and 18 inches from the ground).
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If the plaintiff can show a lawful fence in good repair, 62 he can recover
damages if livestock break the fence down and consume or destroy forage.
Since evidence of livestock trespass may be ephemeral, however, some
fencing-out statutes employ fence viewers whose role is to examine the
fence and assess the alleged damages as soon as possible after the entry. 63
Nevertheless, though fencing-out statutes may impose liability on intruding
graziers, they continue the policy of favoring the owner of livestock over
the owner of property by allocating the risk of harm to property owners
who fail to erect and maintain lawful fences.
Some Western legislatures, however, have delegated livestock trespass
policy to localities by enacting herd laws. '4 Like fencing-out statutes,
herd laws differ in their details, but in essence they allow a majority of
taxpayers or voters in designated areas to adopt the traditional common
law rule. In herd districts, the relational positions of livestock operators
and landowners are reversed. Livestock operators, who under open range
law had unrestricted privileges to let their animals wander, have, in herd
districts, strict duties to control them. Livestock operators are strictly
liable for the trespasses of their animals.' 65 Landowners, on the other
hand, move from a regime of no-claims to claims. In Hohfeld's world,
property rights depend upon what courts and legislatures do.' 66
B.

Livestock Trespass Law and the Taylor Grazing Act
State livestock trespass law operates alongside the Taylor Grazing Act,
which purports to leave intact the police power of the public domain
states. 67 Inherent in this power is the authority to define livestock trespass.' 6

162. See, e.g., Nelson v. Tanner, 113 Utah 293, 194 P.2d 468 (1948) (plaintiff cannot prevail
when his irrigation system has eroded passageway under fence).
163. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 25-2203 to -2206 (1990). There are three viewers. One is appointed
by the property owner, one by the livestock owner, and one by the first two. Within six days of
the alleged trespass, they are to determine whether the fence is lawful and, if it is, assess the
damages. Their findings are enforceable by court order. The measure of damages is the value of
the forage consumed or destroyed. See, e.g., Anderson v. Jensen, 71 Utah 295, 265 P. 745 (1928).
164. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-1421 to -1424 (Supp. 1990); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC.
CODE § 17127 (West 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 25-2401 to -2402 (1990); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
607.010 to .015 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 16.24.010 (1962).
165. See, e.g., Maguire v. Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 590 P.2d 85 (1979).
166. Cf. R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 225 (1990) ("law is something that licensed
persons, mainly judges, lawyers, and legislators, do .... "). I am familiar, of course, with the
standard criticism of this view: that if the law is nothing but what lawmakers do, then those sitting
at the highest levels of government can never be faulted for mistakenly identifying what the law
is. See, e.g., H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138-44 (1961). I do not see the force of this criticism,
however, for they can always be faulted for failing to understand what the law should be.
167. 43 U.S.C. § 315n (1988). This provision states that
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as restricting the respective States from
enforcing any and all statutes enacted for police regulation, nor shall the police
power of the respective States be, by this Act, impaired or restricted, and all laws
heretofore enacted by the respective States or any thereof, or that may hereafter
be enacted as regards public health or public welfare, shall at all times be in full
force and effect: Provided, however, That nothing shall be construed as limiting
or restricting the power and authority of the United States.
168. See Ricca v. Bojorquez, 13 Ariz. App. 10, 473 P.2d 812 (1970) (state statute allowing the
creation of herd districts is consistent with Section 315n of the Taylor Grazing Act).
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The BLM itself, of course, is not subject to state control. A grazier who
willfully allows his livestock to enter a grazing district without a permit
is liable for the value of the forage they consume, any injury they do
to the property, and any expenses incurred by the agency in impounding
the animals. 6 9 It is immaterial that the BLM may not have put up a
lawful fence to keep the livestock out. Under the Constitution's property
absolutely or fix the terms on
clause, "[t]he United States can prohibit
' 70
which its property may be used.'
For permittees and lessees, on the other hand, the local livestock trespass
law is crucial. Consider the facts and holding of Garcia v. Sumrall. 7'
The plaintiffs brought an action to recover damages for willful trespass
upon lands in Arizona they held under a Taylor Grazing Act lease. The
leasehold was situated in open range. The lessees had used the property
for many years as a goat farm. 72 At some point, the neighboring owners
of patented land erected a drift fence on their property that led cattle,
when pasture was short, to wander onto the plaintiffs' leasehold. The
Grazing Act lessees alleged that consumption of their pasturage by their
neighbors' cattle had caused the loss of several hundred goats.1'1 The
defendants argued that the claim was barred by the lessees' failure to
maintain a lawful fence in accordance with the Arizona fencing-out statute.
The lessees countered that the absence of a lawful fence was immaterial
because the trespass was willful. They asserted
that one who released animals upon either the open range or his own
premises under such circumstances he knew or should have known
that the natural and probable result would be that the animals would
wander upon other private premises, was, merely by reason of his
knowledge of such fact and intention to profit thereby, guilty of
willful trespass.174
Following the line of this argument, one reaches the position that overstocking land contiguous to that of another in open range, where the
natural wandering of livestock would lead them to cross boundaries to
reach pasture, would be sufficient alone to establish willful trespass. And,

169. This is grazing trespass, rather than livestock trespass. See supra notes 91-96, 145 and
accompanying text.
170. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (holding that fencing-out statute is not a
defense against complaint of willful trespass onto federal lands brought by United States). The
property clause declares that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S.
CON ST. art. IV, § 3; see also Fraser v. United States, 261 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1958) (federal
government is not required to fence its land).
171. 58 Ariz. 526, 121 P.2d 640 (1942).
172. It is worth noting that at the time of the alleged trespass, the plaintiffs' lease had actually
expired. The defendants argued that since no lease was in effect at the time in question, the plaintiffs
did not state a cause of action. The court analyzed this issue as a matter of state law and held
that the plaintiffs were tenants month-to-month, entitled to possession against anyone but the federal
government. Id. at 530, 121 P.2d at 644. Subsequently, the lease was renewed.
173. Id. at 529, 121 P.2d at 643.
174. Id. at 530, 121 P.2d at 644.
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as we have seen, this is the law of livestock trespass in some Western
75
jurisdictions. 1
The Arizona court rejected this approach, however, and held for the
defendants. The court concluded that
the mere knowledge or expectation by one who turns cattle loose in
a place where he has a right to release them that they may or probably
will wander upon the lands of another, or that he overstocks his own
land so that the same effect may be produced, is not alone sufficient
to constitute willful trespass. There must be some overt and unlawful
act on the part of a defendant which tends to increase the natural
propensity 1of
cattle to wander and to direct them upon the premises
76
of another.

The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that had the BLM,
instead of the lessees, brought a trespass action against the defendants,
the BLM would have prevailed on the very same question.' 77 A trespass
against private parties is defined by local law, but a trespass against the
federal government is defined by the BLM. For permittees and lessees,
local law controls; for the BLM, it does not.
In some situations, of course, Taylor Grazing Act permittees and lessees
obtain the advantages of state livestock trespass law. In Allied Properties
v. Jacobsen,'7 8 for example, a Grazing Act permittee impounded and
removed trespassing livestock from his grazing allotment. The livestock
owner claimed that the impoundment and removal of his cattle constituted
trespass. He argued that authority to remove trespassing livestock from
the public domain was exclusively vested in the BLM. 7 9 According to
the court in Allied Properties, however, the issue was not a matter of
federal law. Instead, under the controlling Nevada law, the owner could
not complain unless the permittee injured the livestock in removing them.8 0
The Nevada law conferred a Hohfeldian privilege on the permittee to
8
exert his right of exclusion by self-help.' '

175.
176.
Colo.
177.

See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
Garcia, 58 Ariz. at 536, 121 P.2d at 645. The court relied on Richards v. Sanderson, 39
270, 89 P. 769 (1907).
See Light, 220 U.S. at 537 (running cattle with the expectation that they would normally

wander and enter a federal reserve constitutes willful trespass); Fraser, 261 F.2d at 285 (federal
government is not required to fence its land).
178. 75 Nev. 369, 343 P.2d 1016 (1959).
179. Id. at 378, 343 P.2d at 1021.
180. This prohibition against injury is a common feature of livestock trespass statutes. See, e.g.,
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 35-46-106 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 569.440 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 3611-10 (1987). In Montana and South Dakota, however, trespassing bulls can be castrated at will.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4212 (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 40-28-1 (1985).
181. According to the Nevada court, the livestock owner:
suffered no damage through breach of any right he possessed unless, and only
unless, he was injured by the manner in which the cattle were removed. There is
no indication that such was the case. The damage resulted from not permitting the
cattle to remain where they were. To allow a recovery for such damage simply
because they were removed by [the permittee] and not by BLM would be to . ..
permit [the plaintiff] to profit by his own wrong ....

[The livestock owner] cannot

complain because the removal was effected by [the defendant] rather than BLM,
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It is, however, difficult to generalize about the fit between the Taylor
Grazing Act and state livestock trespass laws given the dissimilarities of
the rules between and even within the Western states. Moreover, despite
section 315n's statement to the contrary,'8 2 the range code does have the
effect of preempting some features of state law. The Idaho fencing-out
statute, for example, defines a lawful fence as one that is not less than
fifty-four inches high, with a bottom board or wire not more than twenty
inches above the ground.'"3 Other fencing-out statutes, such as C6lorado's,
require that the fence be strung with barbed wire.'84 The BLM, on the
other hand, may require fences that allow passage by wildlife. For
example, to permit the passage of antelope, fences must not be more
than thirty-eight inches high, with a bottom strand of smooth wire. 85
This type of fence would not be lawful under either the Idaho or Colorado
fencing-out statute.
Similarly, though permittees and lessees are held to the local law when
their livestock move outside the boundaries of their BLM allotments, the
86
Taylor Grazing Act may influence the outcome. In Elquist v. Rasmussen,
for example, a federal district court sitting in Utah applied a Nevada
open range rule to hold that no liability exists "for the simple trespass

of stock wandering from the public domain upon unfenced private rangelands."' 8 7 Further, the court held that so long as the permittee complies
with his permit, there can be no claim of willfulness "as a matter of

law." 18 By the same token, courts have held that the granting of a
permit does not give rise to a claim against the government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act 8 9 when the permittee's cattle subsequently tres-

pass on adjoining private lands.' 9°
The livestock trespass statutes and the Taylor Grazing Act together

illustrate the fact "that Hohfeld's vocabulary cannot be mechanically

since such removal has not injured him in any right possessed by him.
Allied Properties, 75 Nev. at 378, 343 P.2d at 1021. In Hohfeldian terms, the livestock owner
whose trespassing animals are impounded and removed has a no-claim unless the livestock are
injured during their removal. Or, from the other point of view, the landowner has a privilege to
remove trespassing animals provided he does them no harm. Several state statutes permit impoundment
and provide a lien on the trespassing livestock. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 3-1427 (Supp. 1990);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-46-108 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 25-2201 (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4215 to -217 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 36-11-10 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 40-28-7 (1991).
These statutes also provide damages for the consumption of forage. Cf. Anderson v. Jensen, 71
Utah 295, 265 P. 745 (1928).
182. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
183. IDAHO CODE § 35-101 (1990).
184. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 35-46-101 (1984).
185. See United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 620 F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (D. Wyo. 1985).
186. 381 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1967).
187. Id. The permittees base property was in Utah, separated from the grazing district by a fence
running along the Utah-Nevada border. The cattle properly entered the allotment through this fence
and then moved onto the defendant's land situated on Nevada open range.
188. Id. at 324. Perhaps this was based on the unstated presumption that the BLM does not
allow overstocking that might lead to trespass. This would be, of course, a presumption without
a rational basis. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
190. Id.; see, e.g., Kunzler v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 79 (D. Utah 1961).
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applied." 9 Does a Grazing Act permit convey a privilege or a claim?
The answer is that permittees get both privileges and claims, but whichever
one exists in any given instance depends on who occupies the other side
of a Hohfeldian relationship. If that other person is a Range Conservation
Officer monitoring the biotic health of the allotment, the permittee has
a privilege.' 92 If, on the other hand, he is a neighboring rancher who
has deliberately turned loose his cattle on the allotment without authorization by the BLM, the permittee has a claim. 93 Both are property
rights, yet they are fundamentally different in nature.
V.

COEXISTING RIGHTS OF OCCUPANCY

The livestock trespass law and the Taylor Grazing Act also illustrate
the complexity of the concept of property from a relational perspective.
Rights of exclusion should not be confused with exclusivity. The law of
the range is by no means one of absolute exclusivity in the sense that
all Hohfeldian claims are not only multital but universal. 94 Instead, most
grazing claims are multital but not universal, and some are merely paucital.
That these paucital and multital claims may only be employed to prevent
the entry of certain identifiable persons, but not others, is proof of
Hohfeld's relational concept. If X can exclude Y but not Z, then property
rights involve relations between people, rather than simply possession of
a tangible object. 95
The occupancy claims of permittees and lessees may coexist with similar
claims held by a significant number of other individuals. We have seen,
for example, that there are several permittees and lessees in group allotments. 96 These are not, however, the only persons who may have

rights to enter the allotment. In addition, there are hunters, hikers, desert
homesteaders (if there are any so intrepid), and so on. There are two
groups who, because of the elaborate complexity of their relations with
permittees and lessees, are especially interesting in terms of the relational
concept of property. They are Native Americans and hardrock mineral
prospectors. Their claims have foundations in the law of aboriginal title
and the federal mining law.

191. S. MUNZER, supra note 119, at 21.
192. See Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 1944) (permit creates mere privilege
"withdrawable at any time for any use by the sovereign"). When a permittee holds a privilege
against X, X has no duty not to interfere with the permittee's occupancy.
193. See, e.g., Elquist, 381 F.2d at 323-24 (under the law of Nevada, no claim exists for the
simple trespass of stock wandering upon unfenced private lands, but a claim does exist for the
deliberate driving of cattle onto the lands of another). When the permittee holds a claim against
X, X has a duty to take care not to disturb the permittee's occupancy.
194. S. MUNZER, supra note 119, at 89.

195. In Garcia v. Sumrall, for example, the court held that Taylor Grazing Act lessees are "entitled
to the possession of the premises as against anyone but the United States government." 58 Ariz.
at 530, 121 P.2d at 644 (1942).
196. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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A.

Aboriginal Title
97
Aboriginal title secures the possessory rights of Native Americans.
Although these rights are previously unrecognized in the sense that they
have not been confirmed by a federal treaty or statute, title is obtained
when Indian tribes or individuals can show actual and continuous occupancy and use of public lands outside the boundaries of Indian reservations.19s Aboriginal title is based on the fact that Indians were the
"owners and occupants" of this country before the European colonization.' 99 Until it is extinguished by Congress, this title is valid against

all parties. 200 In at least one important respect, aboriginal title is similar

to a grazing permit: though both may be extinguished without compensation, 20 1 the rights of occupancy they convey are enforceable until the
extinguishment occurs.
In several cases, Native Americans have asserted grazing rights on lands
administered by the BLM under an aboriginal title theory. In each case,
this assertion has been made against an effort of the BLM or a permittee
to have the Indians and their livestock removed from the range. 20 2 United
States v. Dann,0 a for example, concerns a conflict between the BLM,
Taylor Grazing Act permittees, and two Western Shoshone ranchers
grazing cattle in a BLM grazing district without a Section 15 permit. In
Dann I, lawyers for the BLM filed a complaint against Mary and Carrie
Dann, two Western Shoshone, alleging that they were trespassing on the
Elko Grazing District in Nevada by grazing their cattle there without a

permit. 2°4 The Danns asserted in their defense that they held tribal ab-

original title to the land in question giving them a right of occupancy
and use.
After several rounds of litigation, the Supreme Court held in Dann
III that the Mary and Carrie Dann could not assert tribal aboriginal

197. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277-79 (1955).
198. United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 50 (1984).
199. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wail.) 211, 243 (1872). For a discussion of the origin of aboriginal
rights, see Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MIN. L. REV. 28 (1947).
200. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941).
201. Extinguishment of aboriginal title is not compensable under the fifth amendment. Tee-HitTon Indians, 348 U.S. at 289; cf. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 489, (1973) (holding that
the cancellation of Taylor Grazing Act permits is not compensable under the fifth amendment).
But Indian title recognized by a treaty or statute is a compensable interest. United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
202. United States v. Hatahley, 220 F.2d 666, 667 (10th Cir. 1955), rev'd, Hatahley v. United
States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956); United States v. Hosteen Tse-Kesi, 93 F. Supp. 745, 747 (D. Utah
1950), remanded, 191 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1951); Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862,
863, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 886 (1952). In Hatahley, the BLM forcibly removed horses and burros
known to be owned by Navaho under color of the Utah abandoned horse statute, sold them to a
glue manufacturer, and delivered the proceeds to the Grazing District Advisory Board. 351 U.S.
at 176. The Indians were awarded damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1988), and the BLM was enjoined from further interference with their occupancy.
203. There are four reported opinions in this litigation. They are United States v. Dann, 873
F.2d 1189 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 234 (1989) (Dann IV); United States v. Dann, 470
U.S. 39 (1984) (Dann I1); United States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1984) (Dann I); United
States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (Dann 1).
204. Of course, a similar complaint could have been brought by permittees themselves. See, e.g.,
Murphy v. Nielsen, 132 Cal. App. 2d, 282 P.2d 126 (1955).
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title.25 This question had been addressed by the claims court in a separate,
but related, case involving a claim for compensation for the extinguishment
of the Western Shoshone's tribal title. The claims court had affirmed
an award of approximately twenty-six million dollars in compensation
made by the Indian Claims Commission, and held that tribal title had
been extinguished sometime in the latter part of the nineteenth century.206
Although this money was not distributed because the Western Shoshone
refused to cooperate in devising a distribution plan, the Supreme Court
held that it had been paid. 201 Payment for the taking of aboriginal title
establishes conclusively that title has been extinguished. 2°8
The Supreme Court's decision in Dann III mooted further consideration
of the Danns' tribal title claim. The Court, however, created a new
wrinkle by noting that payment would not bar the Danns from raising
individual aboriginal title as a defense to the government's trespass action.
The Court stated that it had previously "recognized that individual
aboriginal rights may exist in certain contexts, [though] this contention
[had] not been addressed by the lower courts [in the already long-running
Dann litigation]" (footnote omitted). 2°9 The issue reached the court of
appeals in Dann IV. It marked the first instance in which a federal court
was asked to consider the issue of individual aboriginal title. 210

205. Dann III, 470 U.S. at 44.
206. Temoak Band of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States, 593 F.2d 994 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979). This claim for compensation was brought under the Indian Claims
Commission Act, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (terminated in 1978 by ch. 959, § 23). The Claims
Commission Act authorized claims for the taking of aboriginal title. This gave Indians a remedy
for the extinguishment of title separate from the fifth amendment. The Claims Commission Act
has now expired, however, leaving no remedy.
Throughout their grazing rights case, Mary and Carrie Dann disassociated themselves from the
Western Shoshone claim for compensation. See Dann IV, 873 F.2d at 1192. They had joined with
other Western Shoshones to intervene in the Claims Commission proceedings and argue that tribal
title had never been extinguished. Their motion to intervene was rejected in Western Shoshone Legal
Defense & Educ. Ass'n v. United States, 531 F.2d 495 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976)
(finding the Temoak Band to be a proper representative of the Western Shoshone tribe).
This original Claims Commission claim was filed in 1951. For the latest installment, see Temoak
Band of Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 74 (1989) (finding the
Western Shoshone claim for compensation for the taking of their water to be barred by statute of
limitations).
207. During the course of the Claims Commission case, even the Temoak Band came to agree
with the Danns that tribal title was still valid. Accordingly, they moved to stay the Claims Commission
proceedings. Their motion was denied in Temoak Band of Western Shoshone, 593 F.2d at 994.
But all the bands have continued to refuse the award. The $26 million is deposited in an interestbearing trust account in the United States Treasury. See Dann III, 470 U.S. at 42.
208. United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976).
Just what event extinguished this title is not certain. When what is now Nevada was acquired by
the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, various bands of Western Shoshone occupied
and used approximately 22 million acres of the future state. 9 Stat. 922 (1848). Aboriginal title
survived the transfer of territory in the Treaty. See Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. at 345-46. At
some subsequent moment, however, tribal aboriginal title must have been extinguished.
209. Dann Ill, 470 U.S. at 50.
210. In a footnote the Supreme Court cited Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 227 (1923);
Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. at 357-58; and Cohen, supra note 199, at 53-54. See Dann II1, 470
U.S. at 50 n.14. Neither cited case uses the term individual aboriginal title, but both do seem to
rely on the concept. Since Dann IV, individual aboriginal title has been raised in two other cases.
See United States v. Kent, 912 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir. 1990) (defendant failed to prove individual
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Aboriginal Title and the Taylor Grazing Act

It is often said that a prerequisite of aboriginal title is occupation and

use of the land in question from time immemorial.2 1 ' The Danns, however,
could make no such claim. Instead, Dewey Dann, the father of Carrie
and Mary Dann, had started herding livestock in the Crescent Valley of
Nevada during the 1920s. 11 But the court of appeals noted that in Cramer,
title "was not aboriginal in the usual sense of long or indefinite duration. ' 213 In that case, aboriginal title was based on occupation and use
of public land by three Indians and their lineal ancestors for approximately
sixty-five years. 21 4 In Dann IV, the court held that the Danns' period of
occupation and use was long enough to establish individual aboriginal
title, provided it had not been extinguished in the interim. 2 5,
The first problem for the Danns, however, was the claims court's
decision that tribal aboriginal title had been extinguished during the latter
part of the nineteenth century. 21 6 Could Dewey Dann have established
individual aboriginal title to the grasslands of the Crescent Valley if tribal
title had already been extinguished? Yes. The court held that the invalidity
of tribal title would not be fatal. Even after tribal title has been extinguished, "the individual Indian taking possession may acquire an occupancy right within the rule of Cramer."217 In other words, individual
aboriginal title does not depend on the existence of tribal aboriginal title
at the time possession and use are commenced.

aboriginal title to lands within Klamath National Forest); Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752
F. Supp. 1471, 1479-82 (D. Ariz. 1990) (plaintiffs failed to raise issue of individual aboriginal title
in timely fashion).
211. See, e.g., Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. at 345; see also Note, Indian Title: The Rights of
American Natives in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 655
(1975).
212. Dann IV, 873 F.2d 1193. When the Crescent Valley was later included in the Elko Grazing
District, Dewey Dann was "erroneously advised that he must obtain permits and pay fees, and he
did so from 1936 until his death." Id. When his ranch passed to Carrie and Mary Dann in the
1940s, they continued to herd livestock in the District but did not obtain grazing permits.
213. Dann IV, 873 F.2d at 1197.
214. Cramer, 261 U.S. at 225.
215. The court of appeals stated that "it appears that [individual title is] subject to extinguishment
by the United States, as is other Indian 'aboriginal' title." Dann IV, 873 F.2d at 1197 (emphasis
added). The court's hesitation on this point is interesting, given Congress' plenary power in Indian
affairs. There is the further question, however, of whether extinguishment of individual title would
be a taking under the fifth amendment. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians dealt with tribal title only. See TeeHit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289 (1955) (holding that unrecognized tribal title
is not a compensable interest). Even in that context, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians has been severely criticized.
See, e.g., Frickey, Congressional Intent, PracticalReasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal
Indian Law, 78 CALiF. L. REv. 1137, 1223 (1990) ("On its facts and reasoning, Tee-Hit-Ton was
outrageous.").
216. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
217. Dann IV, 873 F.2d at 1199. By taking this position, the court saved itself the trouble of
figuring out whether tribal title really had been extinguished. The soundness of the claims court's
holding on extinguishment of tribal title was never considered by the Supreme Court, since actual
payment of the Indian Claims commission award extinguished tribal title anyway. The claims court
had pointed to the cumulative effects of the Homestead Act, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (authorizing
homesteading on all unappropriated public lands), and the Treaty of Ruby Valley, 18 Stat. 689
(1869) (opening Western Shoshone territory to prospectors and timber cruisers). The claims court's
evidence of extinguishment was not particularly strong.
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Moreover, the court of appeals held that neither tribal nor individual
aboriginal title had been extinguished by either (1) enactment of the
Taylor Grazing Act or (2) inclusion of land in a grazing district subsequent
to Dewey Dann's occupancy. 218 The court noted in passing that inclusion
in a grazing district might be material to determining the time rather
than the fact of extinguishment. 2 9 This might be a necessary inquiry
when, for example, payment of compensation shows that title was extinguished at some undetermined point prior to the payment. 220 Here,
however, the Claims Court had found already that tribal title had been
extinguished prior to enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act, and the Court
of Appeals in Dann IV agreed. 22 This means that the Grazing Act does
not bar claims of entry by Indians without BLM permits or leases.
Next, the court dealt with the particular claim asserted by Mary and
Carrie Dann: that they were entitled to run cattle and horses in a group
allotment in a BLM grazing district without a permit. The court held
that the principle of Cramer would support such a claim, 222 but it went
on to say that individual aboriginal title "must have been acquired prior
to the withdrawal of the lands from open grazing and their subjection
to the regime of the Taylor Grazing Act ... and have been continuously
exercised since that time. ' ' 223 Persons asserting individual title claims to
public lands would have to prove continuous occupation and use from
the time of any withdrawal from the public domain. 224 Because Dewey
Dann started herding livestock in Crescent Valley before the enactment
of the Taylor Grazing Act, the22 5court held that Mary and Carrie Dann
held individual aboriginal title.
This being the case, to what extent are the Danns subject to the
regulation of the BLM? The court of appeals held that they would have
to comply with "reasonable regulation that is shown to be essential to
the conservation of the common resources and does not discriminate
against Indians." 226 Yet suppose, for example, that the Elko Grazing
District were to suffer from a drought necessitating a reduction in active
use. 227 Although the Taylor Grazing Act gives the Secretary of the Interior
broad powers "to preserve the land and its resources from destruction
or unnecessary injury, ' 228 it does not authorize him to do so by interfering

218. See Dann IV, 873 F.2d at 1199 n.6.
219. Id.
220. Payment of compensation is conclusive of the fact that aboriginal title has been extinguished,
but does not itself extinguish title. Id. at 1198. Only Congress can extinguish aboriginal title. The
Claims Court has no such power.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1199.

223. Id. at 1199-1200.
224. In Dann IV, the relevant date was that of the enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act, November
26, 1934. In United States v. Kent, 912 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1990), where the claimant asserted
individual aboriginal title to lands within the Klamath National Forest, the date was that of the
Forest's establishment. Id. at 278 (citing Dann IV).
225. Dann IV, 873 F.2d at 1200.
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
228. 43 U.S.C. § 315a (1988).

Spring 1992]

PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF THE RANGE

with aboriginal title. In fact, the Grazing Act states that none of its
provisions "shall be construed in any way to diminish, restrict, or impair
any right which has been heretofore or may be hereafter initiated .... ",229
Presumably, the BLM permittees in the grazing district would have to
bear all of the imposed reduction.
Dann IV held that the measure of Mary and Carrie Danns' individual
aboriginal title was the exact number and type of animals being grazed
by Dewey Dann at the time the Crescent Valley was incorporated in the
Elko Grazing District. 2 0 This is the extent of the Danns' Hohfeldian
privilege to enter and use the forage of the grazing district. The BLM
has a correlative no-claim to reduce the measure of this title. Clearly,
the privileges of aboriginal title holders are superior to those of permittees,
but by how much? Would the Danns, for example, have to comply with
grazing rotation schedules intended to move livestock through the allotment seasonally? In many respects, the relational positions of the Danns
and the BLM, which will be embodied in their respective claims, duties,
privileges and no-claims, remain to be established.
C.

Hardrock Mining
Although the Mining Law of 1872231 does not give a hardrock mineral
prospector a privilege to pasture livestock on his mining claim in a BLM
grazing district,23 2 it does allow him to cut down trees providing shade
for the livestock of permittees, block them from water, endanger them
with mine shafts and other diggings, frighten them with explosives, and
'233
generally act as if "his roadway runs anywhere he wants it to go.
Grazing districts are open to hardrock prospecting, and prospectors who
make mineral discoveries acquire privileges superior to those of BLM
permittees. 2 4 To obtain rights under 235
the Mining Law, a prospector must
discover a valuable mineral deposit.
What is a mineral? Dozens of mining decisions have failed to establish
a coherent test. The cases involve materials as disparate as peat, water,

229. Id. § 315.
230. The case was remanded for a finding of fact on this point. Dann IV, 873 F.2d at 1200.
231. 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C. (1988)).
232. See Powell v. United States, 233 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956). In Powell, the court of appeals
held that persons who hold unpatented mining claims under the Mining Law may not rely on those
claims to pasture livestock without a permit on Taylor grazing districts. The plaintiff held a valid
mining claim and argued that it entitled him to run sheep on the land subject to the claim. He
alleged that the BLM's effort to prevent him from doing so was a tortious interference with his
rights under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988). The court summarily rejected
Powell's claim. Powell, 233 F.2d at 855. It is equally true that the Taylor Grazing Act does not
give grazing permittees the right to locate and remove minerals from land subject to their permits.
See Bowman v. Udall, 243 F. Supp. 672, 678 (D.D.C. 1965).
233. Thomas v. Morton, 408 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (D. Ariz. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 552 F.2d
871 (9th Cir. 1977).
234. 43 U.S.C. § 315e (1988) ("[Njothing herein contained shall restrict prospecting, locating,
developing, mining, entering, leasing, or patenting the mineral resources of such districts under law
applicable thereto.").
235. 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1988).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

gravel and building stone. 2 6 Determining whether a prospector has made
a valuable discovery has proven to be even more problematical. The rule
is that there is no discovery unless the mineral can be extracted at a
profit.2 7 The difficulty is that each claim, in terms of profitability, is
abundantly exceptional. "Each situation, each tract of land, each showing
of mineralization, each market, and each time frame is unique. '238 In
some cases, discovery has been shown despite the complete absence of
commercial production. 2 9 In others, discovery has not been shown despite
a long history of commercial production.m Every mining case is an
exercise in ad hoc decisionmaking.
Any person who has a "legal claim" 24 1 to public land adversely affected
by a mining claim may initiate a private contest before the Department
of the Interior to challenge the miner's right.2 42 BLM grazing permittees
and lessees have been held to have legal claims providing standing to
initiate private contests. 241 A challenger must show that the miner's claim
does not describe a mineral or that the deposit is not marketable at a
profit. Thomas v. Morton2M provides an instructive example. The plaintiff
held a BLM grazing lease. The defendant held an unpatented mining
claim. Citing a number of nuisances created by the mining operation,
the court held that the interests of the lessee and the miner were sufficiently
adverse to give the grazier standing.4 5
The facts were these: the miner had interfered with the grazing
lessee's water pump, taken down his gates and fences, put up barriers
to his cattle, excavated holes and tunnels, and touched off numerous
explosions. 246 These nuisances were the miner's right, however, provided he held a cognizable mining claim.2 47 The crux of the matter
was the foundation and weight of evidence presented by expert witnesses on the assay value of certain mineral samples, 248 extraction

236. For a collection of decisions on what a mineral is, see I ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW
FOUNDATION,

THE AsmucAN LAW OF MINING 159-73 (1983).

237. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968).
238. J. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 159 (1987).
239. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Watts, 726 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1984).
240. See, e.g., Barrows v. Hickel, 447 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1971).
241. In re Pacific Coast Molybdenum Co., 68 I.B.L.A. 325 (1982).
242. Private contests are brought under 43 C.F.R. § 4.450-1 (1991). The pertinent parts of this
provision read as follows:
Any person who claims title to or an interest in land adverse to any other person
claiming title to or an interest in such land . . . may initiate proceedings to have
the claim of title or interest invalidated for any reason not shown by the records
of the Bureau of Land Management. Such a proceeding will constitute a private
contest and will be governed by the regulations herein.
243. See Sedgwick v. Callahan, 9 I.B.L.A. 216 (1973).
244. 408 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Ariz. 1976).
245. Id. at 1371.
246. Id. at 1370.
247. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
248. According to the grazier's assayer, the most valuable samples were worth $0.75 per ton.
According to the miner's assayer, the most valuable were worth $48.51. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. at
1372-33. The court was not favorably impressed with the credentials and sampling techniques of
the miner's assayer. Indeed, the court called attention to the fact that some of the miner's samples
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costs, 2 4 9

and whether the operation on the whole was a prudent investment. Unfortunately for the defendant, his expert witness was not
well versed in the marketability rule. On cross-examination, the expert
testified as follows: "I said it was a valid claim, it was a valid mineral
' 250
discovery. I did not say it was . . . commercially feasible to develop.
This, of course, meant that the location was not a discovery and the
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
Thomas turned out to be an easy case for the lessee. Assume, however,
a different set of facts. Suppose, instead, that a crisis in the Middle
East drives the price of petroleum-based fertilizer so high that farmers
begin to search for substitutes. An enterprising amateur spelunker discovers vast caverns full of bats in the limestone highlands of southeastern
New Mexico, owned by the federal government and managed by the
BLM. She files a claim under the Mining Law and launches an amazingly
successful commercial venture, selling bat guano. In the process, she
makes the BLM grazing district where the caverns are located virtually
unusable by the grazing permittees who have been there since the enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act.
A relational concept of property recognizes that "[aill members of
society have innumerable powers and liabilities. All law has to do with
the creation and destruction of these legal advantages and disadvantages." ' 25' The central question in a private contest brought by grazing
permittees against our spelunker would be this: is guano a mineral? In
answering this question the court would be allocating, in Hohfeldian
terms, privileges and no-claims. This is a somewhat neutral way of saying
that the court would in fact be allocating power and vulnerability. "The
grant of a property right to one person leaves others vulnerable to the
will of the owner. Conversely, the refusal to grant a property right leaves
the claimant vulnerable to the will of others, who may with impunity
infringe on the interests which have been denied protection. ' 252 Assume
that the court holds that guano is a mineral. 25 a This holding deems the
spelunker a "miner" within the meaning of the mining law and makes
the graziers subordinate to her will.
D. Property and Power
A hardrock miner on public land with a valid mining claim, in both
the colloquial and Hohfeldian sense, has a judicially enforceable property
right. But this claim is not judicially enforceable because it rests on some
a priori principle that allows us know property when we see it. To the
were actually collected by his lawyer. Apparently, this is not a good litigation strategy. Id. at 1375.
The court found that the samples were not representative, but were collections of "the best looking
rock" that could be found. Id. at 1374.
249. The range was from $15 to $20 per ton. The higher figure was supplied by the miner's
expert witness. Id. at 1372.
250. Id. at 1374.
251. Goble, supra note 108, at 536.
252. Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U.L. REV. 1,41 (1991).
253. Cf. Richter v. Utah, 27 I.D. 95 (1898) (holding that guano, which is primarily a phosphate,
is a mineral within the meaning of the mining law).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

contrary, it is judicially enforceable because (1) the Mining Law says
that claims to valuable minerals are to be protected 5 4 and (2) a court
has decided that the particular substance in question is a mineral. When
a court makes such a decision, a property right is created and Hohfeldian
powers, immunities, disabilities and liabilities are allocated. Privileges are
exercised, claims are made, duties are either met or not, and no-claims
are brooded in silence.
To Hohfeld, power is the capacity of X to change the legal status of
Y.255 This is the first and fundamental attribute of every property right.
Privileges, claims, duties, no-claims, and the other Hohfeldian attributes
of rights are mere derivatives of X's power to affect Y. Like each of
Hohfeld's terms, power describes a relationship of two persons from one
viewpoint. Power describes the relationship from the perspective of the
dominant party. Hohfeld's correlative term, liability, refers to the same
relationship from the perspective of the dominated. 2 6 A person with a
Hohfeldian liability is a person exposed to the power of another. The
effect that X has on Y may be all to the good, but it may also be all
to the bad. 257 X may be "privileged knowingly to inflict the damage
complained of."' 258 A Hohfeldian no-claim is not merely a negation. It
of the
is also an affirmation "that society will not penalize the holder
2 59
[correlative] privilege when he acts in the privileged way.P
Under the Mining Law, our enterprising spelunker who has discovered
a valuable deposit of bat guano is privileged to make life miserable for
the BLM permittees in the grazing allotment where the discovery is located.
She has this privilege because the courts have said that guano is a mineral.
In any decision in favor of a property interest, "[it is incorrect to say
that the judiciary protected property: rather they called that property to
which they accorded protection. '2 60 Within the meaning of the Mining
Law, a claim to commercially marketable guano on public land is a
private property right judicially protected. The power that accompanies
this newly created right includes the power to diminish, or even demolish,
the pre-existing powers of BLM permittees. A Hohfeldian power is the

254. The statute, by the way, has been the subject of forceful criticism on a number of grounds.
See, e.g., J. LESHY, supra note 238. One of these criticisms is that under the Mining Law the
federal government sells very valuable land at nominal prices. Mineral locators may purchase fee
simple title to public land, and receive a patent, for either $2.50 or $5 per acre, depending on the
type of claim. 30 U.S.C. §§ 29, 37 (1988). In its 1989 evaluation of the Mining Law, the General
Accounting Office reviewed the seven patents issued in 1983 and thirteen others issued since 1970
that happened to be nearby. For these patents the government received less than $4,500. The agency
estimated that their market value was at least $13.8 million and perhaps as much as $47.9 million.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT; THE MINING LAW OF 1872 NEEDS
REVISION 24 (1989).
255. See Hohfeld I, supra note 9, at 54.
256. Goble, supra note 108, at 536.
257. Cf. J. COMMONS, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CArrALIsM 97-98 (1924) (suggesting that the
term exposure conveys, better than the term liability, the fact that the effect on Y may be to the
benefit of Y).
258. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1894).
259. Corbin, supra note 133, at 233 n.6.
260. Cohen, supra note 3, at 380 (quoting Walton Hamilton).
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"capacity to create or extinguish powers and liabilities in other persons.
Law is therefore an endless chain affair with power-liability relations as
the links .... ",261 Claims and privileges are the operating mechanisms of
power.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The primary goal of this article has been to use the law of the range
to illustrate the relational nature of property law. To do so, it has
employed the vocabulary of Wesley Hohfeld. Hohfeld was not the first
to observe that property interests are relational. 262 His achievement is to
describe these relations in a handful of terms capable of capturing the
multifarious forms these relations take. This is no mean accomplishment.
Perhaps the most provocative of scholarly endeavors are those that start
''a contest between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance
and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises great things. "263
The entrenched vocabulary of property includes concepts like easements,
profits a prendre, licenses, covenants, and conditions. None of these
terms fits Taylor Grazing permits and leases, though courts occasionally
have applied them in range law cases. 264 For example, violation of the
terms of a Taylor Grazing permit is grounds for cancellation, whereas
breach of a covenant is grounds for damages only. 265 An easement merely
conveys some type of right-of-way, 26 whereas a grazing permittee may
make productive use of the land subject to the permit. A profit a prendre,
on the other hand, does allow productive use of the servient estate, but
unlike a grazing permit it is both assignable and inheritable. 267 A license,
unlike a grazing permit, may not support a claim of trespass against a
third party. 26 These dissimilarities are substantial.
A second goal of this article has been to show that, despite these
dissimilarities, permits and leases do carry property rights. If property
is a network of relational claims, duties, no-claims and privileges running

261. Goble, supra note 108, at 536.
262. Cf. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 38-46 (T. Knox trans. 1942) (suggesting that with only
one person in the world property could not exist, for terms like "mine" and "yours" would have
no meaning); A. SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 10 (R. Meek, D. Raphael & P. Stein eds.
1978) (noting that rights of property have to do essentially with the ability of one person to prevent
or permit another from obtaining access to land); J.J. ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGINS
AND FOUNDATIONS OF INEQUALITY AMONG MANKIND 109 (M. Cranston trans. 1985) (suggesting that

the social reality of property is that one man draws a line around a piece of land and gets others
foolish enough to respect it). Of course, respect for property boundaries may have more to do
with fear of legal sanction than foolishness. Hence Hohfeld focuses on the existence of legal claims
that invoke the coercive power of the state.
263. R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY,

IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 9 (1989).

264. See, e.g., Sproul v. Gilbert, 226 Or. 392, 359 P.2d 543 (1961) (analyzing Taylor Grazing
rights as if they are profits a prendre).
265. J. CRIBBET, supra note 144, at 215. On cancellation for violation of the permit, see 43
C.F.R. § 4130.6-1 (1990).

266.
267.
timber
268.

J. CRIBBET, supra note 144, at 335.
Id. at 341. Typical profits convey rights to remove seaweed, gravel, soil, minerals, and
from the land of another.
Id. at 347.
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between two particular individuals with reference to a tangible thing, like
a grazing allotment, then clearly Taylor Grazing permits and leases create
property interests. 269 These interests are relatively weak, since they can
be readily extinguished or altered by the BLM. Further, the claims of
permittees and lessees are relatively narrow. We have seen, for example,
that they do not operate against mineral prospectors whose own claims
are superior under the Mining Law. But this is merely additional proof
of property's relational nature. If permittees have claims against some
but not all mineral prospectors, then any non-relational concept of prop27 0 of any
erty is "utterly insufficient to indicate the precise elements"
given situation.
A third goal of this article has been to show that property rights
cannot be understood outside of the particularity of a given situation.
A full-fledged nominalist, Hohfeld is content to arrange little things rather
than describe big ones. Rather than attempting to fit property interests
into abstract categories like "license" and "profit," he focuses instead
27
on the precise claims and privileges that form property relations. ' Entailed
in this is a concept of property as historically contingent. Here, again,
the law of the range furnishes illuminating examples. The evolution of
livestock trespass law is only the most conspicuous.
Law is a product of social forces and a carrier of cultural meanings.
For example, tribal title would have been an alien concept to many prereservation Indians. Quite often, land use rights were not tribal at all,
but were held by bands of more or less closely related family groups.
Sometimes these bands were quite small. 27 2 However, the concept of tribal
269. Stephen Munzer lists some standard incidents of ownership: they are rights "to possess, use,
manage, and receive income; the powers to transfer, waive, exclude, and abandon; the liberties to
consume or destroy; immunity from expropriation; the duty not to use harmfully; and liability for
execution to satisfy a court judgment." S. MUNZER, supra note 119, at 22; see also Honor6,
Ownership, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (FIRST SERIES) 107 (1961). Many of the items in
this list are also incidents of grazing permits and leases. These include claims to possess, use, receive
income, and exclude others. This certainly does not suggest that permittees and lessees are owners
of public grazing lands, but it does suggest that they have some kinds of property interests even
as traditionally understood.
270. Hohfeld III, supra note 9, at 70.
271. As Hohfeld puts it,
it is a serious obstacle to close analysis and clear thinking that courts and writers
habitually deal with the easement (as they do also with all other legal interests) as
if it were a simple unity to be adequately described by a few loose and ambiguous
terms such as "property," "title," "ownership," '"right of ownership," "right,"
"privilege," "incorporeal (!)right," etc.-terms utterly insufficient to indicate the
precise elements involved. In none of the books has a strict analytical method been
pursued. Some typical "definitions" disclose at a glance how hopelessly inadequate
they are to indicate the varieties of jural relations actually included in each of the
various kinds of easements.
Hohfeld I1, supra note 9, at 70 (footnote omitted).
272. See generally Albers & Kay, Sharing the Land: A Study in American Indian Territoriality,
in A CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 47 (T. Ross & T. Moore eds. 1987).
There was certainly no such thing as a Western Shoshone tribe in a sociopolitical sense. This ethnic
group was divided into a large array of small bands. It is not even known whether those living in
the vicinity of what is now the Mary and Carrie Dann ranch in Elko, Nevada had a collective
name for themselves, though some Northern Shoshone called them the tsogwiyuyugi, or "those who
shake like jelly." See Thomas, Pendleton & Cappannari, Western Shoshone, in 11 HANDBOOK OF
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS: GREAT BASIN 262, 280 (1986).
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title facilitated the acquisition of Indian lands by colonizing Europeans
accustomed to thinking in terms of large-scale, highly structured sociopolitical institutions. If tribal chiefs empowered to convey tribal lands
did not exist, European governments, and eventually the United States,
273
invented them.
Of course, the possibilities of cultural meaning abound. Assume, for
example, that a land ethic were to become more widely shared than it
is now. 274 We then would treat our rangelands more respectfully than
we have in the past. 27' The law of the range would have to accommodate
the cultural forces behind this transformation. The claims of private
individuals to use public lands would become weaker; the duties of these
individuals would become heavier. Moreover, these changes would affect
not only the claims and duties of graziers, but also of off-road motorists, 276
hardrock miners, 277 and many others who use, and frequently abuse,
public lands. If that were to happen, the law, and this article, would
have to be rewritten, for law is the product of its time and place.

273. See P. HOLDER, THE HOE AND THE HORSE ON THE PLAINS:
AMONG NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 101-03 (1970).

A

STUDY OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

274. This alludes, of course, to the writings of Aldo Leopold. See especially A.

SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE

(1949).

LEOPOLD,

A

275. Wallace Stegner is one who recognizes that this would involve a shift in cultural meanings.
In his homage to Aldo Leopold, he says that "[w]hen this forming civilization assembles its Bible,
its record of the physical and spiritual pilgrimage of the American people, the account of its
stewardship in the Land of Canaan, A Sand County Almanac will belong in it, one of the prophetic
books, the utterance of an American Isaiah." Stegner, The Legacy of Aldo Leopold, in COMPANION
TO A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 233 (J. Caldicott ed. 1987).
276. But see Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1985) (though off-road race through
California Desert Conservation Area is inherently harmful to desert ecosystem, BLM approval of
such a race is not an abuse of discretion).
277. Perhaps this is a period of transition. Compare Clark, 774 F.2d 1406 with Trustees for
Alaska v. Environmental Protection Agency, 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1984). In the latter case, the
court agreed that the Mining Law of 1872 gave locators property rights to pollute downstream
waters. It held, nevertheless, that given the strong public interest in clean water, a restriction on
the exercise of these rights would not be a constitutional taking.

